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INTRODUCTION
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judicial action for falsely raising expectations, becoming a "hollow hope"
for social reform by proposing remedies which cannot be successfully im-
plemented.' Employing both a constitutional theory and a positive polit-
ical theory perspective, this Article compares the recent education reform
litigation in Kentucky and New Jersey. This comparison highlights the way
in which different approaches to adjudication help to define the political
dynamics of the reform debate and contribute-or fail to contribute-to
remedying the alleged constitutional violation.3
The education reform litigation debate often centers around two re-
lated issues: (1) the substantive interpretation of relevant state constitu-
tional provisions4 and (2) the less frequently considered issue of why a
remedy ordered by a state court succeeds or fails.5 Commentators tend to
1. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has generally failed to implement its activist agenda for civil rights, repro-
ductive rights, and the environment). Rosenberg bases his argument on his analysis of fed-
eral court decisiomnaking, but he extends its conclusions to the ability of all courts to
effectuate social reform. Id. at 338.
2. This Article uses the term "positive political theory" to describe the insights derived
from modeling and conceptualizing politics as a strategic game. As Professor Eskridge has
shown, the use of such a model "deepens our understanding of the interaction between the
Court, the Congress, and the President." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331, 334 (1991). Positive political
theory illustrates how "policy is set through a sequential process by which each player-
including the Court-tries to impose its policy preferences. The game is a dynamic one
because each player is responsive to the preferences of other players and because the pref-
erences of the players change as information is generated and distributed in the game." Id.
3. Unfortunately, political scientists often fail to consider that courts can serve as
agenda-setters. See, e.g., JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLl.
cEs 16 (1984) (listing the participants in agenda-setting as "the President, the Congress,
bureaucrats in the executive branch, and various forces outside government (including the
media, interest groups, political parties, and the general public)"). However, legal commen-
tators are often more attentive to the judiciary's ability to set the agenda. See, e.g., Donald
W. Crowley, Implementing Serrano: A Study in Judicial Impact, 4 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 299,321
(1982) (noting that Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (1977), successfully helped set the agenda
for education reform in California); Alan G. Hickrod, Edward R. Hines, Gregory P.
Anthony, John A. Dively & Gweyn B. Proyne, The Effect of Constitutional Litigation On
Educational Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. EDuc. FIN. 180 (1992) (concluding that
constitutional litigation focuses attention on education and increases spending).
4. Several commentators have pursued this perspective. See, e.g., William E. Thro, To
Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639 (1989); Richard J. Stark, Education Reform: Judi-
cial Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-Adequacy Vs.
Equality, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 609 (1992).
5. One recent work, Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State
Courts, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1072 (1991), examines the question of remedies, but not from
the standpoint of positive political theory or constitutional theory as used in this Article.
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conclude either that courts will almost always fail to drive meaningful re-
form6 or that courts just need to push harder to remedy a constitutional
violation.7 In contrast, this Article suggests that courts can make a differ-
ence-not by mandating specific remedies, but by effectively framing the
issues, by using their powers of persuasion to articulate a constitutional
vision of education, and by defining the roles of other political actors in the
effort to reform a state's educational system.8
Optimism about courts' abilities to drive reform has been tempered by
the difficult history of implementing the school desegregation remedies
that stemmed from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education L9 The Court's call to desegregate with "all deliberate
speed"'10 failed to overcome effectively the southern resistance to integra-
tion."L Efforts to force desegregation by withholding federal funding for
segregated schools met with further resistance," and specific, judicially-
mandated actions such as busing also faltered13 Based on this experience,
6. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 338. Rosenberg concludes that U.S.
courts can almost never effectively produce significant social reform. At best, they can sec-
ond the social reform acts of the other branches of government. "Turning to courts to pro-
duce significant social reform substitutes the myth of America for its reality. It credits
courts and judicial decisions with a power they do not have." Ld.
7. See Note, supra note 5, at 1092.
8. This Article is concerned not only with state constitutional decisions on the school
financing issue presented in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59
(1973) (holding that the U.S. Constitution does not require equal funding between school
districts), but also more general education issues, such as curricular and governance
reforms.
9. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause demands inte-
grated schools).
10. Brown v. Board of Educ. H1, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
11. See e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that school desegregation
must continue despite opponent's efforts to disrupt the educational process). In 1964, ten
years after Brown I, only 2.3 percent of the black school children in the South were attend-
ing integrated schools. See James . Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines & School Desegregation
in the South, 53 VA. L. RFv. 42, 44 n.9 (1967).
12. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(1) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), finally succeeded in advancing the integrative ideal by withholding federal funding
for segregated schools. See ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 48. However, schools still looked
for ways to evade Brown's vision of integrated schools. For example, in 1968, the Court
struck down a freedom of choice plan that had allowed parents to choose where to send
their children to school, leaving a local school system segregated and failing to "convert [the
school district] to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch." Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). The Court
ordered the school district "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work,
and promises realistically to work now." Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
13. In Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971), the Court
supported a remedy that created a school to serve all of Mecklenburg County, North Caro-
lina, and provided for busing students across residential lines to attend the school. This
approach encountered serious resistance and required continued judicial oversight. Within
a few years, the Court's commitment to using busing as a remedy for segregated schools
faltered. See Milliken v. Bradley 1, 418 U.S. 717,745 (1974) (rejecting interdistrict busing as
a remedy to desegregate school districts); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 435 (1976) (overturning lower court order to periodically adjust geographic boundaries
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some commentators conclude that we cannot (and should not) expect
courts successfully to change society.14 Others warn that while courts are
potentially effective vehicles for social change, they should guard against
overreaching their institutional authority.
15
In the midst of its struggle with the desegregation issue, the U.S.
Supreme Court declared in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez that
it would not enter the "thicket" of overseeing school financing to ensure
equal funding among districts." The Rodriguez Court's awareness of its
own institutional limitations suggests that its decision did not necessarily
mean that the Constitution is neutral on issues of educational quality or
equal funding, but simply that the Supreme Court would not attempt to
enforce any such requirement.1 7 Nevertheless, at least twenty-nine state
courts, including those in Kentucky and New Jersey, have entered into
this "thicket," scrutinizing school financing schemes18 despite basic
to limit the "white flight" phenomenon, in which white families fled from urban areas to
predominantly white suburbs).
14. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 338 (outlining the conditions under
which courts are effective producers of significant social change).
15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962) (ar-
guing that "the root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system" and urging "prudence and restraint" in constitutional adjudication). For a modem
version of a theory of judicial restraint, see generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRusT. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (offering a theory based on reinforcing
representation as a limited rationale for judicial intervention into the political process).
16. 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (justifying its holding that disproportionate funding of schools
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that "the ultimate solutions [in
educational financing reform] must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic
pressures of those who elect them").
17. See id at 59; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1250-51 (1978) (suggesting that
state courts may enforce federal constitutional norms governing education, even if the
Supreme Court has declined to do so).
18. See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R,
1993 WL 204083 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973);
Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929 (Cal. 1977) (Serrano If); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I); Lujan
v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359
(Conn. 1977); Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992); McDaniel v. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724
(Idaho 1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d
46 (Ill. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hombeck
v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); McDuffy v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457
(Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); East Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348
N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d
349 (Neb. 1993); Abbott v. Burke II, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke III, 643
A.2d 575 (NJ. 1994); Robinson v. Cahill I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill 11, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied
sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Robinson v. Cahil III, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J.
1975); Robinson v. Cahill IV, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Klein v.
Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975), and vacated, 355 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1979); Robinson v. Cahill V,
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prudential concerns about how to manage and enforce education reform
decisions.19
The Kentucky Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of school fi-
nancing in 1989, when it decided Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.
2 0
The Kentucky court rejected the lower court's holding that the disparities
among school districts created by the state's education system violated the
Kentucky Constitution's equality guarantees.21 Focusing instead on the
state constitution's education clause, which mandates that the "General
Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system
of common schools throughout the state,"2 the court stressed the constitu-
tion's commitment to the overall quality of the school system. Its opinion
sparked public support for reshaping Kentucky's educational system to ac-
commodate both a desire to improve overall quality and a concern for dis-
tributional equity.24
The New Jersey Supreme Court visited the issue of education reform
sixteen years earlier than Kentucky, when Robinson v. Cahill I held that
355 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill VI, 358 A.2d 457 (NJ. 1976); Robinson v.
Cahill VII, 360 A.2d 400 (NJ. 1976); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
Nyquist, 439 N.E2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequalities Today v. Cuomo, 578
N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d
432 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. of the City
Sch. Dist. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch.
Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding,
Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Olsen v. State, 554 P2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v.
Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988);
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Carrollton-Farmers
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
1991); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 SxE2d
859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d
141 (Wis. 1976); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335-36 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (noting that
while this case is not a "political question. ... there are no 'discoverable and manageable
standards' by which a court can determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when it is
violated," and "the courts simply cannot provide the empirical research and consultation
necessary for intelligent educational planning"), aff'd sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (noting that "the ultimate solutions [in educa-
tional financing reform] must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures
of those who elect them"). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (holding that
denying the children of illegal aliens the right to a minimally adequate education violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
20. 790 S.W2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
21. Id. at 215 (noting that the only governing constitutional provision was the educa-
tion clause of the Kentucky constitution). This contrasts with the lower court's reliance on
the equality guarantee. See Council for Better Educ., Inc. v. Wilkinson, No. 85-CI-1759,
slip. op. at 15 (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. Div. I, May 31, 1988). For the text of the equality
guarantees, see infra note 97.
22. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
23. KY. CONST. § 183.
24. See infra part ILA.
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New Jersey's schools failed to satisfy the state constitution's education
clause.25 That clause requires that the "[1legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools for the instruction of all the children in the state between the ages
of five and eighteen years. '2 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted
the state constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and efficient" education
as requiring the state to give each child an equal "educational opportunity
... to equip [him] for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market. '2 7 The decision initially outlined an open-ended remedy, giving
the legislature fifteen months to resolve the matter.2 8 Despite the legisla-
ture's failure to act in a timely manner, the court decided not to disturb the
current scheme during the 1975-76 school year.29 When the legislature
again failed to act, the court considered shutting down the school system by
enjoining its financing.30 Finally, the legislature reformed the state's school
financing system so as to reduce the funding differences between rich and
poor districts while leaving the overall system intact.31 Although the New
Jersey Supreme Court validated the new arrangement,32 the legislature
failed to fund the new system.33 The court then carried out its earlier
threat and closed the system by enjoining its funding.a4 In response, the
legislature enacted a controversial state income tax to fund the schools. 35
This solution finally resolved the Robinson litigation-after seven trips to
the state's highest court.
36
25. 303 A.2d 273, 295 (NJ. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
976 (1973).
26. NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
27. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295.
28. See Robinson v. Cahill I, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (NJ. 1973) (requiring that the legislature
enact measures compatible with the holding in Robinson v. Cahill I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.
1973), by December 31, 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976
(1973).
29. See Robinson v. Cahill 11I, 335 A.2d 6, 7 (NJ. 1975) (denying injunctive relief on
the basis that a redistribution of funds during the school year would result in inequity and
chaos). The court did arrange to hear oral argument on March 18, 1975, to resolve four
issues: 1) the definition of "thorough and efficient" into financial terms, 2) the extent of the
court's power to order relief, 3) the ways in which the court should use this power, and 4)
the appointment of a special master. Id. at 7.
30. See Robinson v. Cahill IV, 351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975), and vacated, 355 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1979).
31. See RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FI-
NANCE REFORM 108-13, 200 (1978).
32. See Robinson v. Cahill V, 355 A.2d 129, 132 (NJ. 1976).
33. LEHNE, supra note 31, at 122.
34. See Robinson v. Cahill VI, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (NJ. 1976) (enjoining any state,
county, or municipal official from expending funds to support any public school), modified,
360 A.2d 400 (1976).
35. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 54A:2-1 to 54A:9-27 (West Supp. 1994).
36. Robinson v. Cahill VII, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976).
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More recently, in 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted its
education clause in Abbott v. Burke 11,3 7 the subject of the second case
study in this Article.A8 The court declared that the state failed to provide
adequately for twenty-eight "special needs" districts.39 The legislature re-
sponded promptly,' but ultimately diluted the reform legislation in the
face of intense public pressure.41 Thus, the court intervened again in Ab-
bott v. Burke III, ordering additional funding for these districts by the 1997-
98 school year.42
This Article draws on the experience of education reform ushered by
the recent coi.rt-ordered remedies in Kentucky and New Jersey. It argues
that to alter the political status quo and effectuate meaningful education
reform, courts must (1) force a new consideration of the state's educational
problems, (2) create a sense of urgency and crisis, and (3) provide legisla-
tors with political protection, or "cover," for enacting comprehensive re-
form. To create these conditions, courts need to connect the constitutional
violation and its remedy to the intuitively appealing goal of overall educa-
tional quality.43 The alternative approach, which focuses solely on distribu-
tional equity, fails to reflect the constitutional mandate and invites
significantly greater political resistance.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision to emphasize the overall
quality of the educational system may explain its comparative success in
motivating education reform. However, certain conditions in New Jersey
might have frustrated any judicially instigated reform efforts in New
Jersey-even those along the lines of the Kentucky example. The key dif-
ferences between the states include the overall quality of the state's educa-
tional system at the outset of the litigation, the extent to which school
districts across the state vary in their wealth and racial composition, and
the extent to which citizens identify with the state. Undoubtedly, these
environmental factors constitute formidable constraints to education re-
form and certainly help to account for the different results of the education
reform efforts in the two states."
Part I of this Article outlines various theories of constitutional inter-
pretation and applies them to the adjudication of state constitutional
clauses governing education in order to develop the ideal interpretative
strategy for implementing education reform. Part I then discusses how the
37. 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990). Abbott v. Burke I, 495 A.2d 376 (NJ. 1985), dealt with
procedural issues, requiring plaintiffs to exhaust potential administrative remedies before
turning to the courts. 495 A.2d at 394.
38. See infra part II.B.
39. Abbott II, 575 A2d at 363.
40. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
42. Abbott v. Burke 1II, 643 A.2d 575, 577 (NJ. 1994).
43. This Article employs the term "overall quality" to indicate an adequate level of
quality in education provided to all students (i.e., a concern for "educational adequacy").
44. See infra notes 239-54 and accompanying text.
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successfully implemented decision in Kentucky effectively followed this
ideal interpretive strategy, while the New Jersey court pursued an alterna-
tive strategy. Part II, which outlines the education reform efforts in New
Jersey and Kentucky, considers whether the most successful political strat-
egy for education reform is to follow the best interpretation of the educa-
tion clauses. Specifically, Part II models the struggle for education reform
through the use of positive political theory (conceiving of policymaking as
a political game) to analyze whether the political dynamics of education
reform militate in favor of the ideal interpretative strategy. Part III then
draws on the lessons of Part I's constitutional theory and Part II's positive
political theory analyses to suggest that courts, litigators, and political ac-
tors should seek to meet the three conditions outlined above to successfully
effectuate meaningful education reform. Finally, Part III contrasts the
demographic profiles of the two states and considers to what extent they
explain their different experiences with education reform.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE Focus ON QUALITY
Decisions calling for education reform implicate basic questions of ju-
dicial legitimacy, such as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" inherent in
any judicial override of legislative decisions45 and the possibility that the
judiciary will be unable to implement some of its decisions.46 Judicial cau-
tion in ordering reform is evidenced by certain principles, such as the
standing and political question doctrines, that enable courts to avoid adju-
dicating certain thorny issues. 47 Such caution, which Alexander Bickel has
termed "prudence, 48 can dissuade a court from challenging an unconstitu-
tional state of affairs. 49 Indeed, critics who believe that state constitution
45. See BICKEL, supra note 15, at 19. Bickel's concern stems from the fact that when-
ever the unelected judiciary seeks to impose its will on the popularly elected legislature, it
engages in an anti-democratic exercise. Id.
46. For a more detailed discussion of the potential constraints on judicial action, see
infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27
(1974) (holding that a citizen lacked standing to challenge the commission of members of
Congress into the army because the alleged injury was too abstract); see also Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 736, 766 (1984) (holding that the impact of IRS regulations upon integra-
tion was non-justiciable because the causal connection was too attenuated and the injury
could not be judicially redressed). Some term these prudential doctrines as "hot potato"
doctrines because they are so malleable that the Court can reach the merits if it so chooses.
See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Court performed a cursory analysis of the injury
under the standing doctrine in order to reach the merits of the case and uphold the Price-
Anderson Act).
48. See BICKEL, supra note 15, at 70-71 (explaining that prudence requires the "passive
virtue" of deciding to "withhold constitutional judgment" on a particular issue that might
encounter resistance from popular opinion or the majoritarian branches).
49. Some state courts have relied on such doctrines to avoid reaching the merits on
school financing litigation. See, e.g., Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d. 360, 365, 367 (Pa. 1979)
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education clauses focus on distributional equity make precisely this accusa-
tion: courts tolerate unconstitutional results when they exercise restraint
and defer to the legislature.50 On this account, courts face a difficult di-
lemma in deciding school financing cases. Either they can follow the dic-
tates of a constitutional mandate for distributional equity, which will be
frustrated in practice,5' or they can focus on overall quality, which achieves
better results but appears to depart from the constitutional mandate.3
However, this Article suggests a third alternative, arguing that state consti-
tutions' education clauses are properly interpreted as expressing a concern
for overall quality. Courts that adopt this approach vill spark successful
reforms, in part because of its appeal to the public.
This third alternative employs an interpretative theory that directs
judges to read state constitutions' education clauses as embodying deeply
held views of justice 53 This approach understands that constitutions,
unlike statutes, cannot be easily revised and their interpreters must heed
Chief Justice Marshall's advice that "we must never forget that it is a con-
stitution that we are expounding."' 4 Indeed, this strategy offers an attrac-
tive normative methodology: judges can not only justify their
constitutional decisions so as to maintain the judiciary's legitimacy, they
also can justify their decisions by appealing to the public's deep concern for
justice. Moreover, this strategy directs judges not to deny the legislature its
proper role in constitutional interpretation. Otherwise, they risk stifling
efforts to build consensus as well as entangling the court in complex and
highly politicized policy decisions.
(holding that plaintiffs did not meet the state's standing requirements to allege a constitu-
tional violation, because no one had suffered the necessary injury).
50. See Note, supra note 5, at 1092 (concluding that only when the judiciary ceases to
defer to the legislature will the constitutional promises of education be upheld).
51. This failure in practice is illustrated by the case study of New Jersey discussed in the
positive political theory model outlined below. See infra part ILB.
52. The value of focusing on overall quality is illustrated by the successful education
reform effectuated in Kentucky. See infra part 1IA.
53. This approach to constitutional interpretation looks to the moral authority of prin-
ciples deeply held by the community. In this sense,
judicial review is also idealistic, for it is essentially concerned with the interpreta-
tion and implementation of moral ideals. Our ideals are aspirational goals; they
define the kind of people we would like to be. In this respect, they differ from our
needs, which also signify some lack or incompleteness but imply nothing certain
about our moral betterment (which may or may not be promoted by their
satisfaction).
Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE U.-. 1567,1577
(1985). Alexander Hamilton first articulated this view that judicial review speaks for "the
people" in a moral sense in his defense of judicial review in Federalist No. 78. 1d at 1574
n33.
54. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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A. Constitutional Theory and State Constitutions' Education Clauses
A basic goal of constitutional theory is to identify the qualities that
distinguish a constitution from ordinary legislation and justify judicial re-
view of legislative action. In one classic explanation, Ronald Dworkin has
argued that broadly cast constitutional provisions should be interpreted as
expressing a coherent vision of justice.55 In Dworkin's view, the public's
deep commitment to a concept of justice is later interpreted and translated
into specific conceptions when applied to cases before a court.5 6 Another
explanation, recently offered by Bruce Ackerman, argues that the Consti-
tution derives its meaning through the process of public participation in
"higher-track lawmaking." 57 According to Ackerman, it is during those
rare "constitutional moments," characterized by a deliberative and active
debate, that the public commits to constitutional principles and codifies the
higher-track law of the constitution.58 Both Dworkin and Ackerman con-
clude that courts, through judicial review, are authorized to protect the fun-
damental public commitments embodied in the Constitution.5 9
While Dworkin and Ackerman contemplate the federal Constitution,
their approaches also apply to interpreting certain state constitutional pro-
visions. Like the federal Constitution, the drafters of state constitutions
generally viewed themselves as agents of the public, and sought to codify
deeply held public commitments. 60 Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, echoes this view of state constitutions:
It is a function of a constitution and constitutional law, then, to
preserve a community's most basic, or overarching, values in the
face of its transient choices. Moreover, it is a function of the
courts to ascertain and identify these most basic values, to flag
them when they are at risk, and to preserve constitutional bound-
aries on majority rule.6'
55. RONALD M. DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 368 (1986).
56. Id. at 70-72. For example, Dworkin explains that the Constitution embodies a com-
mitment to a concept of "equal protection of the laws" which is not opaque and should not
be narrowly construed. Id. at 362-63. The difficulty of this task is captured by Justice Jack-
son's reflections on how to "translat[e] the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, con-
ceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into restraints
on officials dealing with the concrete problems of the twentieth century." West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
57. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6-7 (1991).
58. Id.
59. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 356; ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 10.
60. For example, a delegate to the Maryland Constitutional Convention, who himself
doubted the value of a public education system, still supported a constitutional guarantee
for education because "as the people seemed to think there was something in them, there-
fore he was content to admit that there was something in them." Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 884 n.43 (W. Va. 1979) (quoting DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CON.
VENTION OF 1867, 247 (1923)).
61. Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of
American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 54 (1988).
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Some commentators contest the application of federal constitutional
theory to state constitutional interpretation. Alan Tarr, for example, ar-
gues that state constitutions generally do not embody basic public commit-
ments because their form is more statutory than constitutional. This
argument, while true with respect to certain state constitutional provisions,
does not apply to state education clauses.6 Unlike many other state con-
stitutional provisions, the education clauses are broadly writtene and em-
body basic commitments, such as preparation for self-govermances that
are similar to those of the federal Constitution. As the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained, "there can be little doubt that the constitutional
provision for public education, designed to serve the needs of an enlight-
ened citizenry in a democratic society, was intended by its framers to be
expansive in its application. ' 66 The "expansive" education clause, a con-
cept in Dworkin's terminology, 67 must be applied to new situations in order
to maintain high quality educational systems. Furthermore, although state
constitutions are more easily amended than the federal Constitution, states
appear to take seriously changes in their education clauses s which bolsters
the analogy between state constitutional education clauses and provisions
of the U.S. Constitution.
Critics also note that state constitutionalism lacks its own meaningful
discourse to guide the interpretation of specific clauses.69 However, state
education clauses represent not only the state's commitment to education,
62. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 Tip. L REv. 1169, 1181-
85 (1992).
63. Tarr suggests that state constitutional provisions should be given independent effect
if the provisions reflect a textual departure from the federal Constitution or stem from a
unique political and historical justification. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and
State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RtrraERs LJ. 841, 855 (1991). Both conditions exist
with respect to state education clauses.
64. See, e.g., Ky. CoNsT. § 183; NJ. CON T. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1. For the text of these
clauses, see supra notes 23 and 26 and accompanying text.
65. See Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government. The Rights to Education
Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 96-101 (1989) (arguing that the state
constitutional education clauses embody a basic commitment to preparation for self-
government).
66. Levine v. State Dep't of Inst. & Agencies, 418 A.2d 229, 236 (NJ. 1980).
67. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
68. For example, the New Jersey Senate considered and ultimately rejected changing
its constitutional mandate on education to circumvent an unfavorable court ruling. See infra
notes 194-97 and accompanying text. Kentucky, meanwhile, has not amended its education
clause since it was passed in 1891. Ky. CoNsr. § 183, annot. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin
1992). Similarly, state courts approach interpretation of these clauses as cautiously as they
approach federal constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Levine, 418 A.2d at 235-36 (explor-
ing the state's fundamental obligation to develop an educated citizenry); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,206-09 (Ky. 1989) (examining legal precedents interpret-
ing the education clause).
69. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REv. 761, 812 (1992) (noting the failure of state constitutionalism to provide a
"workable model for the contemporary practice of constitutional law and discourse on the
state level").
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but also the constitutional value of education protected, but not enforced,
by the federal Constitution.70 As such, state courts have borrowed from
federal constitutional discourse in interpreting these clauses.71
If Ackerman and Dworkin accurately depict constitutional lawmaking
as the result of serious public deliberation, constitutional interpretation
need not be a frustrating battle against prevailing political forces, but
rather a search for the best application of the public's commitment to a
political principle. Christopher Eisgruber has argued that because consti-
tutional interpretation is a search for and application of the public's com-
mitment to political principles, its results should reflect the public's deepest
and most thoughtful views, rather than its reflexive reactions to an issue.72
Hence, constitutional interpretation may be an especially sophisticated
poll, rather than a poor cousin to an opinion survey.73 Eisgruber's account
suggests that constitutional interpretation will often yield results similar to
those of James Fishkin's deliberative public opinion poll.74 Unlike the typi-
cal telephone poll, which elicits reflexive answers, Fishkin's poll requires
ordinary citizens to discuss issues, deliberate, and offer their reflective
judgments.75
Eisgruber's view of constitutional interpretation, combined with
Fishkin's approach to public opinion, indicates that a major constitutional
decision cannot be successfully implemented unless it sparks discussion of,
70. For an argument outlining the constitutional value of education, see Akhil R.
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1210 (1991) (arguing for a
reversal of San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) and the establish-
ment of a constitutional right to education). For the classic statement of the view that state
courts should enforce this constitutional value, see Sager, supra note 17, at 1250-51 (sug-
gesting that state courts may enforce constitutional norms governing education because the
Supreme Court has declined to do so claiming, in part, a lack of institutional competence).
71. In fact, state courts adjudicating education reform cases often cite federal cases
addressing education-most notably Brown v. Board of Educ. I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See,
e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190 (Ky. 1989) ("The goal of the framers of our constitution, and
the polestar of this opinion, is eloquently and movingly stated in the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education.").
72. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Rela-
tion Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DuKE L.J. 1, 31 (1993).
73. 1&
74. JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEM.
OCRATIC REFORM 1-13 (1991).
75. Fishkin describes the poll designed to be employed in the context of presidential
primaries as follows:
The first evaluation of candidates would have the thoughtfulness and depth of
face-to-face politics, as well as the representative character of a national event that
includes us all. It offers a way out of the false dilemma within which previous
reforms [to enhance the quality of participation in the presidential selection pro-
cess] have been trapped. It is not elitist; a deliberative opinion poll is representa-
tive of ordinary citizens. But it permits the reflectiveness of small-scale
interactions to replace the comparative superficialities of mass-retail and wholesale
politics.
I. at 9.
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and ultimately connects with, the public's basic constitutional commit-
ments. Not surprisingly, Eisgruber also suggests that courts should act as
educative institutions to further that process. He encourages courts to
draft their opinions so as to draw on the public's civic identity and to lay
the foundation for the implementation of their decisions.76
Political resistance to a court decision does not necessarily mean that
the constitutional provision at issue has been misinterpreted. Instead, it
may mean that the judiciary has failed to challenge the public to deliver a
deliberate-rather than a reflexive-opinion, or that it has ignored the
role of the political process in constitutional interpretation." In adjudicat-
ing state education clauses, courts should not dictate the specific require-
ments of the constitutional mandate, but should turn to the legislature to
implement the basic constitutional commitment to quality education.78
Otherwise, public resistance to the judicial decision may delay efforts to
build a consensus on how to implement the right to an adequate educa-
tion.79 In addition, courts that try to outline a specific remedy (for exam-
ple, the number of districts to be funded) risk involving themselves in
policy judgments for which the legislature is institutionally better suited.f0
76. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is The Supreme Court An Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 961, 968 (1992) (arguing that a particularly effective form of persuasion
based on collective identity relies on appeals such as "[i]t's the American thing to do").
77. The New Jersey court, which outlined a specific remedy for education reform that
demanded very little creativity and input from the public and the political process, may have
failed to accept these groups' roles as participants in constitutional interpretation. See infra
notes 116, 181-82 and accompanying text.
78. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rtv. 410, 430 (1993), for a lucid explanation of this view.
79. Justice Ginsburg makes this point with regard to the Court's abortion
jurisprudence:
With prestige to persuade, but not physical power to enforce, with a will for self-
preservation and the knowledge that they are not "a bevy of Platonic Guardians,"
the Justices generally follow, they do not lead, changes taking place elsewhere in
society. But without taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too force-
ful to contain, the Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or sig-
nal a green light for social change.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking In A Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. RExv. 1185, 1208 (1992)
(citations omitted).
80. William R. Andersen explains:
If a court ventures too far into the specifics of an educational policy dispute-
especially, again, in the setting of constitutional litigation-the characteristic drag
of legal doctrine could prove very hurtful. ... But how responsive can the legisla-
ture be when the concept is woven into the fabric of the constitution? Especially
in fields as fast-moving as [education reform], freedom to change seems unusually
important, and specific legal mandates seem accordingly less desirable.
William R. Andersen, School Finance Litigation-The Styles of Judicial Intervention, 55
WAsH. L. REv. 137, 169-70 (1979). See also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186,217 (Ky. 1989) (Gant, J., concurring) ("This Court has neither the expertise nor
the power to instruct the General Assembly as to how the constitutional deficiency should
be corrected.").
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B. Examining the Interpretation of State Education Provisions:
The Cases of Kentucky and New Jersey
Like most states, New Jersey and Kentucky have constitutionalized
their commitment to a system of public education.8' While most states
delegate administration of the public education system to local school
boards, state legislatures retain the ultimate responsibility for implement-
ing the public's commitment to education.' Neither state's constitution,
however, focuses on educational equity;83 instead, each one guarantees an
"efficient system" of education.' 4
Both New Jersey's and Kentucky's education clauses define the nature
of the entire system of education rather than the status of different groups
within the system.s5 Thus, they do not suggest a redistributive interpreta-
tion. Moreover, the provisions' focus on the educational system as a whole
is consistent with the understanding of the American federal system articu-
lated by Paul Peterson. He argues that the national government attends to
distributional issues through progressive taxation and welfare provisions,
while states and municipalities focus on developing their local economies.
8 6
The governor of Kentucky during the education reform process, Wal-
lace G. Wilkinson, clearly viewed education as primarily serving a develop-
mental purpose:
As we proceed with our efforts to improve education, I believe we
must recognize the economic consequences of our educational
policies. Perhaps it is time to examine school reform issues in the
81. See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REv. 777, 814 n.138 (1985) (listing constitutional edu-
cation provisions in every state except Alabama and Mississippi, both of which have since
added such a provision); Stark, supra note 4, at 627-28 n.90 (listing provisions).
82. 1 WILLIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW PUBLIC AND PRIVATE § 1.2 (1985). The
Kentucky Supreme Court stressed this point. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 ("The sole re-
sponsibility for providing the system of common schools is that of our General Assembly.").
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently emphasized this point as well. See Abbott v.
Burke III, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (N.J. 1994) ("It is the State and only the State that is responsi-
ble for this educational disparity, and only the State can correct it.").
83. In fact, most states' education clauses are silent on distributional equity concerns.
See Thro, supra note 4, at 1669-70 (noting that "[b]ecause the state education clauses have
limited utility as vehicles for public school finance reform, litigants have searched for alter-
native state constitutional provisions that would be more effective").
84. Ky. CONST. § 183; NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
85. This observation is consistent with the republican origins of these clauses, which
were directed toward the community as a whole. See Hubsch, supra note 65, at 100.
86. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 69, 77 (1981). Peterson explains: "All mem-
bers of the city thus come to share an interest in policies that affect the well-being of that
territory. Policies which enhance the desirability or attractiveness of the territory are in the
city's interest, because they benefit all residents-in their roles as residents of the commu-
nity." Id at 21 (emphasis added). Peterson finds that states take an intermediate position
between the central and local governments on these issues. Id. at 77. He refuses to classify
education as either a developmental or redistributive concern because of its potential to
serve either end. Id at 42, 52.
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larger context of economic development policy. We have no
choice but to make a significant investment in the human capital
required to keep us competitive.87
The developmental function of education coheres with its traditional justifi-
cation. Many state constitutions' education clauses reflect their drafters'
belief that a universal right to a quality education is necessary for a republi-
can government. 88 Together, the concerns of civic and economic develop-
ment provide a powerful rationale for the universal right to a quality
education-a rationale used by both the Kentucky and New Jersey
Supreme Courts. The Kentucky court "view[ed its] decision as an opportu-
nity for the General Assembly to launch the Commonwealth into a new era
of educational opportunity which will ensure a strong economic, cultural
and political future."'  Similarly, the New Jersey court explained that edu-
cation reform is necessary "to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a
competitor in the labor market." 90 The joining of the traditional and the
more modem justifications for a quality educational system reflects
Learned Hand's description of judicial interpretation as a process in which
a judge must "preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty of
an overshadowing past; but he must discover some composition with the
dominant trends of his times."91
1. Kentucky: A Model of Judicial Interpretation
In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court focused on the constitutional
provision as an expression of the public's overall goal for its educational
87. Wallace G. Wilkinson, Education Reform and Economic Competition: Critical Is-
sues, 15 J. EDUC. FiN. 603, 609 (1990).
88. Hubsch, supra note 65, at 99. This rationale for a right to education certainly
emerges from an analysis of Kentucky's education clause. See Kern Alexander, John Brock,
Larry Forgy, James Melton & Sylvia Watson, Constitutional Intent: "System," "Common,"
and "Efficient" as Terms of Art, 15 J. EDUC. FIN. 142, 162 (1989) [hereinafter Constitutional
Intent] (concluding from an analysis of the history of Kentucky's provision that it "estab-
lishes certain limitations below which the legislature cannot justifiably fall").
89. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,216 (Ky. 1989).
90. Robinson v. Cahill I, 303 A.2d 273,295 (NJ. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
91. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARv. L REv. 361, 361 (1939). Others,
such as Edward Fadeley, an associate justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, view the poten-
tial conflict between the traditional justification of civic development and the more modem
justification of economic development as the central interpretive issue facing courts adjudi-
cating education reform litigation. See Edward N. Fadeley, Determining the Scope of State
Constitutional Education Guarantees: A Preliminary Methodology, 28 Wtiu rmrE L.
REv. 333 (1992). This Article will not address this interpretive question, but suggests sev-
eral possible responses: that economic and civic development are not necessarily incompati-
ble; that the provisions share a basic commitment to an adequate education for all; and that
any potential conflict between these two justifications might be resolved through Dworkin's
connection between the public's commitment to a general concept of education and a spe-
cific conception of it, which could include a concern for economic, as well as civic,
development.
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system. 2 The court declared that the state had failed to fulfill its constitu-
tional commitments, but refused to criticize the legislature's previous ac-
tions.93 Instead, as Eisgruber suggests, it sought to connect the decision to
the public's civic identity and pride.94 In response, the public viewed the
decision as legitimate.
9 5
Whether for prudential or constitutional reasons, or both, the Ken-
tucky court chose to defer to the legislature and the political process.
Although it refused to specify the precise changes necessary to develop an
"efficient" system of education, it suggested a framework to guide the legis-
lature's deliberations.96 The Kentucky Supreme Court did not view the
issue as a question of equity deriving from Kentucky's "equality guarantee"
clauses, 97 but rather as a question of how to apply the education clause to
92. The Kentucky Supreme Court specifically addressed the purpose of the education
clause:
In reaching this decision, we are ever mindful of the immeasurable worth of educa-
tion to our state and its citizens, especially to its young people. The framers of our
constitution intended that each and every child should receive a proper and ade-
quate education ....
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189-90. Kentucky's commitment to education follows Thomas Jeffer-
son's vision that education should be constitutionalized, since democracy depends on im-
proving the minds of the public. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON "rrB STAT1 OF
VIRGINIA 148-49 (William Peden ed., 1954) (1787). Kentucky's commitment reflects Jeffer-
son's vision, which may stem from Jefferson's role in Kentucky's constitutional history. See
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213 (noting that Jefferson authored the state's separation of powers
provisions).
93. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189 ("[W]e intend no criticism of the substantial ef-
forts made by the present General Assembly and its predecessors....").
94. See, e.g., id. at 216 ("We view this decision as an opportunity for the General As-
sembly to launch the Commonwealth into a new era of educational opportunity which will
ensure a strong economic, cultural and political future.").
95. See infra note 107, 160-72 and accompanying text.
96. In defining "efficiency," the court stated:
1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Kentucky is
the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
2) Common schools shall be free to all.
3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state.
5) Common schools shall provide equal educational opportunities to all Kentucky
children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances.
6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure that
they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and no polit-
ical influence.
7) The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in Ken-
tucky have a constitutional right to an adequate education.
8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide each
child in Kentucky an adequate education.
9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the
seven capacities recited previously.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13.
97. The Kentucky "equality guarantee" clauses provide that "[a]ll men are, by nature,
free and equal," Ky. CONST. § 1, and that "[a]ll men when they form a social compact, are
equal," Ky. CONST. § 3. Equality guarantees are not identical to, but are generally inter-
preted similarly to, the federal Equal Protection Clause. Yost v. Smith, 862 S.W.2d 852, 854
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the system as a whole.98 This approach focused on the constitution's com-
mitment to the overall quality of education. 99 As a result, the court de-
clared Kentucky's entire educational system unconstitutional.100
Distributional equity was a secondary concern, reflected in the principle
that "all students, whatever their race or wealth characteristics, be edu-
cated sufficiently to fulfill their civic responsibilities."'' 1 Michael Resnick,
associate director of the National School Boards Association, explained
that statewide involvement in education, such as that effectuated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose, often implicitly addresses equity con-
cerns: "If you have [an increased] state revenue base for education, if the
state is the one collecting the taxes rather than localities, there wil proba-
bly be a greater tendency to allocate money equally."
102
The comprehensive nature of Rose exemplifies a "performance-ori-
ented" approach, focusing on effective instruction and student achieve-
ment,"0 3 rather than formal equality (equal dollars for all districts). This
approach reflects the view that money is not a cure-all ' 01 and that a focus
on formal equality can deflect attention from other barriers to educational
quality. 05 Because Rose stressed educational effectiveness, grounded the
(Ky. 1993) (explaining that the equal guarantee provisions of the Kentucky Constitution
offer the same protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
98. Cf. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215 ("Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is
that Kentucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitutional.").
99. Id at 217 ("Although adequate and additional funding is a necessary part of the
contemplated procedure, money alone is not the answer. Efficiency of administration, cur-
riculum, facilities.... and many other problems are extant and pleading for cure.").
100. Id. at 215. Commentators have lauded the Kentucky litigation and the court's
comprehensive approach to education reform. Se4 e.g., Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Fi-
nance Reform and Systemic School Change: Reconstituting Kentucky's Public Schools, 18 J.
EDUc. FrN. 318, 322 (1993).
101. Hubsch, supra note 65, at 105.
102. Amer. PoL Network, School Finance: The "Jump Off The Cliff" Approach,
DAILY REPORT CARD, Mar. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, RptCrd Fle.
103. William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending
the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between
Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REv. 721, 734 (1992).
104. Richard J. Mumane, who believes that "money matters," nevertheless under-
scores that
remedies should include incentives for local districts and individual schools to de-
vise and implement plans for raising student achievement. Such plans might in-
volve changes in the practices used to hire teachers, and the design of a strategy to
increase the amount of student writing.... [Tjhe dollars must follow the plans.
Richard J. Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on "Does Money Matter?" 28 HARV. J. oN
LEGIS. 457, 462-63 (1991).
105. As Eric A. Hanushek points out, "[e]mphasizing primarily the distribution of ex-
penditures per student, financing reform is almost certain to exacerbate existing problems of
inefficiency... History indicates that while some districts might use additional funds effec-
tively, other districts will probably use them ineffectively." Eric A. Hanushek, When School
Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARv. J. ON LEois. 423, 453-54 (1991).
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issue in a clear constitutional mandate, and appealed to the public's intui-
tive sense of justice,1°' it enjoyed widespread public support. Kern Alexan-
der, an educational expert who closely observed the Kentucky litigation,
described the effect of the court's ruling:
The court's mandate seemed to represent an external force au-
thorizing an important social change that the people intuitively
knew was morally necessary and long overdue. The court deci-
sion and the enactment of the new education law appeared to im-
bue the citizenry with a collective pride of ownership which later
found the most obdurate legislators and reluctant taxpayers ex-
alting themselves with praise for their accomplishments. 1°7
The Kentucky court successfully framed the debate by not only focus-
ing on overall educational quality, but also prodding the legislature to act
according to a timetable, rather than mandating a specific remedial
scheme.' 08 The court's action emerged from its understanding of its role
under the constitution:
Clearly, no "legislating" is present in . . . the decision of this
Court.... Our job is to determine the constitutional validity of
the system of common schools within the meaning of the Ken-
tucky Constitution, Section 183. We have done so. We have de-
clared the system of common schools to be unconstitutional. It is
now up to the General Assembly to re-create, and re-establish a
system of common schools within this state which will be in com-
pliance with the Constitution.10 9
106. Although this intuitive sense of justice can be found by looking to the understand-
ing of the drafters, courts need not be confined to such an analysis. See Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1147, 1156-59
(1993). Nor should state constitutional judgments necessarily follow the U.S. Supreme
Court or look solely to unique state sources. For example, Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487, 491-92 (Ky. 1992), held that the criminalization of homosexual sodomy violated the
state constitution, thereby diverging from the Supreme Court's holding in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (finding that the Due Process Clause, which protects the
right of privacy, does not reach sodomy). Wasson not only considered Kentucky-based
sources, 842 S.W.2d at 493-96, but also examined the position of the American Law Insti-
tute, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute). 842
S.W.2d at 496-98. In the case of education reform, the Kentucky court did not explicitly
discuss the value of result-oriented criteria, but such criteria served as a legitimate interpre-
tive basis for the decision.
107. Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Author-
ity: The Kentucky Case, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 341, 344 (1991).
108. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (allowing
the legislature one year to implement a new educational system).
109. Id. at 214.
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The court chose this remedy because it viewed the state's separation of
powers doctrine as preventing it from mandating any particular legislative
program or taxation scheme. 110
2. New Jersey's Judicial Interpretation: Mired in the Details
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, interpreted its constitu-
tional education clause and the facts presented to it by exclusively focusing
on distributional equity, ultimately crafting a narrow judicial remedy."'
Despite the Commissioner of Education's earlier administrative ruling that
the education clause required a level of adequate educa-
tion,112 the state court declined to take responsibility for the quality of
the educational system as a whole." 3 The court acknowledged that
the problems might be "systemic, requiring a declaration of uncon-
stitutionality."11  However, the court chose to view them as "district-
specific, requiring corrective action under the Act in a limited number
of failing districts." 1 5 The court's remedy did not demand creativ-
ity of the legislature; the opinion simply required it to improve a
selected number of poor urban school districts. 6 Although the court
recognized that money alone could not ensure quality educational for
all,117 it directed that certain districts receive additional aid and that the
110. The court interpreted the "letter and spirit of th[e] constitutional mandate," id. at
213, as requiring a different remedy than that crafted by the lower court. The lower court's
reliance on federal court precedents was improper, since the Kentucky constitution reflects
a different understanding of separation of powers than the federal Constitution. Specifi-
cally, the lower court had created a commission to develop specific remedial measures
rather than leaving that task to the legislature. See id. at 214.
111. Abbott v. Burke 11, 575 A.2d 359,382-89 (NJ. 1990) (addressing the evidence and
concerns related to different spending levels of different school districts); id. at 367 (discuss-
ing how the clause has primarily been viewed as mandating equality).
112. Id. at 365.
113. The New Jersey court explained its "constitutional answer" as solely connected to
monetary concerns and formal equality, not to a level of educational quality.
We have concluded, however, that even if not a cure, money will help, and that
these students are constitutionally entitled to that help. If the claim is that addi-
tional funding will not enable the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and
efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are entitled to pass or fail with
at least the same amount of money as their competitors.
Id. at 403.
114. Id. at 366.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 409.
117. In considering the research analyzing the impact of other factors besides and con-
nected to money, the court explained that the research
shows beyond doubt that money alone has not worked. It shows promising success
in many different approaches emphasizing techniques, relationships, social forces,
motivation, approaches often quite different from conventional instruction. But it
does not show that money makes no difference. What it strongly suggests is that
money can be used more effectively than it is being used today.
Id. at 404.
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legislature address only the narrow issue of equity, rather than overall
quality."
i 8
The New Jersey court, while acknowledging the flaws of its decision,
justified its position by noting that "fundamental [constitutional] limits on
judicial power .. cannot justify a sliding scale which tailors the remedy
[and addresses] issues of fairness unrelated to the constitutional com-
mand."" 9 This explanation is belied, however, by the constitutional theory
applied by the Kentucky court and the remedy that court devised. The
New Jersey court might have balked at the Kentucky approach, as it would
have entailed addressing issues beyond those framed by the litigants. On
the other hand, in education reform litigation, the relief sought by the
plaintiffs should not be dispositive; the nature of the constitutional provi-
sion should structure the nature of the remedy. Given a general constitu-
tional mandate that does not differentiate between districts,2 0 the best
interpretation of the education clause demands an adequate level of educa-
tion for all. A second interpretive reason for a general remedy is that the
constitution clearly delegates responsibility for educational issues to the
legislature. 2' The court's district-by-district remedy limits this delegation.
Finally, practical concerns also caution against a district-by-district remedy,
as money must be supplemented by curricular and administrative reforms
in order to effect substantial educational improvements.
-22
There are several possible explanations for the New Jersey Supreme
Court's refusal to declare the entire state's education system unconstitu-
tional. First, the court was presumably influenced by the state's political
situation."2 Second, the court may have had little confidence in the polit-
ical process' support for educational reform. It had observed the nation-
wide resistance to federal desegregation rulings during the civil rights era
and, closer to home, the New Jersey legislature's resistance to a previous
decision holding the state's educational financing scheme unconstitu-
tional. 24 Finally, the Kentucky approach of declaring the entire education
system unconstitutional and demanding comprehensive education reform
118. Id. at 408-09. The lower court went so far as to define the equity issue in precise
dollar terms. Abbott v. Burke III, No. 91-C-00150, 1993 WL 379818 at *10 (NJ. Super,
Aug. 31, 1993).
119. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 409.
120. The court explicitly stated that it was only interpreting the education clause and
did not rely on the state equal protection clause. See id. at 410.
121. See N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 ("The Legislature shall provide for the main-
tenance and support of a thorough and efficient education....").
122. See, e.g., Murnane, supra note 104, at 462-63; Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 404 (relevant
portions quoted supra note 117).
123. See infra part II.B.
124. The court's frustration in its initial effort to reform education is addressed supra
notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
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was innovative and untested;' s the New Jersey court might have hesitated
before following this radical approach.
3. Evaluating New Jersey's Original Approach: The Path Not Taken
Supporters of the Abbott II decision and Governor James Florio's pro-
posed program might argue that their approach was the only viable strat-
egy. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decision in Abbott
III26 offers the most illustrative example of the path not taken. The Ab-
bott I decision departed from both the lower court's decision and the
New Jersey Supreme Court's Abbott II decision in several ways. First and
most importantly, the decision did not offer specific financial goals or dic-
tate guidelines, as the lower court had done,12 7 but instead forcefully out-
lined the direction and necessity of comprehensive reform.128 Second,
while constrained by the view that the constitutional command did not re-
quire a general remedy, the court underscored that the condition of the
special needs districts was of statewide concern: "While the constitutional
measure of the educational deficiency is its impact on the lives of these
students, we are also aware of its potential impact on the entire state and
its economy-not only on its social and cultural fabric, but on its material
well-being, on its jobs, industry, and business." 1 9 In so doing, the court
sought to appeal to a collective interest and responsibility of the state to
provide a quality education for all students:
[W]e underlined the clear and absolute responsibility of the State
for both the problem and its solution, noting that all of the
money-whether the taxes are local or State-is authorized and
controlled in terms of its source, amount, distribution, and use by
the State, and that all of the students are citizens of the State
130
Third, the court addressed the criticism that the Florio administration
failed to oversee the aid to school districts 31 and emphasized that "the
Legislature or the Department [of Education] should ensure that the uses
125. Both the Kentucky court in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W2d 186
(Ky. 1989) and the New Jersey court in Robinson v. Cahill V, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) selected
open-ended remedies and returned the issue to their respective legislatures. However, the
Kentucky approach was innovative in that it attempted to frame the agenda very broadly,
focusing on overall quality of the entire educational system and creating a sense of urgency.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16.
126. Abbott v. Burke II, 643 A.2d 575 (NJ. 1994).
127. Abbott v. Burke MI, No. 91-C-00150,1993 WL 379818 (NJ. Super, Aug. 31,1993).
128. Abbott v. Burke IlL, 643 A.2d at 580-81.
129. Id. at 581.
130. IL
131. Chris Mondics, New Jersey Ordered To Equalize Aid to Schools The Governor and
Legislature Have Three Years To Bring Poor Urban Districts Up To Par, PmLA. INQuiRER,
July 13, 1994, at B1.
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of the additional funding available to the special needs districts are super-
vised and regulated."' 132 The court's shift in tone and substance reflects
changes in the political landscape which focused attention on the merits of
the Kentucky strategy and of an appeal to a collective identity. In fact,
New Jersey has begun to pursue education reform in a system-wide man-
ner. The plan offered by Governor Christine Todd Whitman, elected in
1993, proposes a more comprehensive and incremental "leveling up" strat-
egy, similar to that employed in Kentucky, to solve the constitutional de-
fects in New Jersey's system of education. 33
II
PosrrivE POLITICAL THEORY AND A Focus ON QUALITY FOR
ALL: EXAMINING THE PoLTICAL DYNAMICS OF
EDUCATION REFORM
To analyze the political dynamics affecting implementation of judi-
cially mandated education reform, this Article will model the institutional
actors (the judiciary, legislature, and executive) as players engaged in a
strategic game.' 34 This Article will chart the players' positions on graphs
where the X coordinate represents changes in distributional equity and the
Y coordinate represents changes in educational quality and efficiency. It is
important to note that the graphs offered in this discussion are not scien-
tific or precise. Rather, they attempt to present a relational progression of
educational policy based on the series of events that set the agenda and the
course of education reform in Kentucky and New Jersey.
As illustrated by the models presented below, a state judiciary's effort
to move policy solely along the X-axis towards greater distributional equity
will fail because the legislature will act in accordance with the electorate's
132. Abbott III, 643 A.2d at 579.
133. See infra notes 206-07. It is certainly too premature to judge the likely success of
the Whitman plan especially since it proposes to improve education partly by economizing
on teachers' salaries. See Iver Peterson, Commission Urges Curbing Pay in New Jersey
Schools, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 9, 1994, at 23. The likelihood of the plan's passage is difficult to
discern because it directly challenges the politically powerful teachers' union. See Iver Pe-
terson, New Jersey Teachers Flex Muscles, But Carefully, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1994, at Bi
("In the tightly knit world of New Jersey politics, no organization has had more muscle than
the New Jersey Education Association, and none has been more willing to use it."). See
also, David P. Rebovich, Governor's Education Policies May Sway Assembly Elections, N.J.
LAWYER, May 15, 1995, at 3. Brian Kladko, Whitman's 'Model' Proposal Garners Disfavor,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (New Jersey), Sept. 19, 1995, at A3.
However, Michigan's education reform plan passed despite the opposition of the
teacher's unions. See James L. Tyson, Michigan's New Tax Scheme Aims To Upgrade Its
Poorer Schools: Instead of Relying on Property Tax, Schools To Get State Sales-Tax Money,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 1994, at 2 (noting that various critics opposed the loss of
local autonomy and that the teachers' unions specifically opposed the increased dependence
on state tax policy).
134. This model assumes that each actor engages in bargaining with the other political
actors to arrive at an equilibrium point that best approximates the policy preferences of all
of the involved actors as mediated by the rules of the policymaking process.
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resistance to such changes. However, if the court frames the issue as pri-
marily one of overall educational quality, or as a Y-axis issue, with a secon-
dary and related focus on the X-axis concern of distributional equity, the
remedy will draw on significantly more public support. Such a remedy will
connect with the public's constitutional commitment to support public edu-
cation. As discussed below, the one-dimensional X-axis story-focusing on
distributional equity-unfolded in New Jersey with a predictable lack of
success. The two-dimensional X- and Y-axis story--centered on concerns
of overall quality-unfolded in Kentucky and successfully sparked mean-
ingful education reform.
In addition to the judiciary's view of the facts and legal principles im-
plicated in an education reform case, several external forces will determine
the dynamics of the strategic game. Among them are (1) whether the court
expects the legislature or the public to overturn the decision through con-
stitutional amendment, 35 (2) whether the decision can be successfully im-
plemented, (3) whether the decision might pose a threat to the judiciary's
institutional legitimacy, 136 (4) the electoral impact of the decision,137 and
(5) the justices' personal reputations within the legal profession.138 To-
gether, these forces will limit the extent to which state judiciaries will craft
radical and innovative remedies for constitutional flaws in state educational
135. Because the issue of school financing is governed by a constitutional provision
rather than an ordinary statute, the probability of a legislative override is lessened, due to
the additional effort required for a constitutional amendment. This difference became an
important factor in New Jersey's educational financing litigation. See infra notes 195-98 and
accompanying text.
136. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791,2814 (1992) (affirming the "cen-
tral holding" in Roe v. Wade because overruling Roe would "seriously weaken the Court's
capacity to exercise the judicial power" by undercutting the Court's legitimacy as an institu-
tion). But see id, at 2883 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Wihether [overruling Roe] would 'subvert
the Court's legitimacy' or not, the notion that we would decide a case differently from the
way we otherwise would have in order to show that we can stand firm against public disap-
proval is frightening.").
137. This concept of electoral impact can be broadly understood to encompass: (1)
recall (see, eg., Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1,1987, at 52 (attrib-
uting the defeat of several judges to unpopular stances, including the recall of California
State Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird)); (2) reelection chances of individual judges;
(3) electoral possibilities of other judges who may be hostile to the views pronounced in the
decision (cf. Fran Ellers, Two Judicial Races Not Expected To Cause Major Shift On State
Supreme Court, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 2, 1990, at B4 (noting the atten-
tion that the landmark school-finance ruling and other major decisions have drawn toward
the popularly elected Kentucky Supreme Court)); or (4) reelection chances of a friendly
governor whose defeat would result in the appointment of hostile judges. All state courts
confront at least some of these considerations and most are directly connected to the polit-
ical process-e.g., only two states (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) have tenure until
retirement and executive appointment similar to the Article M process. See CoUNcIL oF
STATE GOvERNmEmTs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1990-91, at 190-91, 204-05 (1990).
138. See generally David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 1
(1992) (arguing that the "interpretive community" of lawyers serves as a constraint on judi-
cial decision making).
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systems139 and will affect how they communicate their decisions to the
public.1
40
A. The Case of Kentucky: Realizing a Vision of Overall Quality
In deciding Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., the Kentucky
Supreme Court refused to set the agenda for education reform solely from
a distributional equity (X-axis) perspective. In fact, the court rejected the
lower court's finding that the state's education system violated the Ken-
tucky constitution's equality guarantee. 141 Instead, the court held that the
constitutional provision governing education' 42 had been violated and
stressed quality and efficiency (Y-axis concerns) rather than distributional
equity. 4 3 Moreover, the court, mindful of separation of powers concerns
and its limited institutional competence, demanded neither that remedies
be devised for particular districts nor that a particular amount of money be
spent. 44 Instead, the court simply declared the entire school system un-
constitutional on the ground that it failed to provide an adequate education
for all students.14 5 This decision opened a "policy window," 146 or an oppor-
tunity for action, by forcing the legislature to rethink the state's approach
139. Commentators have previously noted how state court judges' broad connection to
and understanding of the political process sharply affects their decisions in adjudicating
cases under state constitutions. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1351-53 (1982) ("[I]nvolvement in the
electoral process surely heightens the sensitivity of state judges to political pressures and
concerns.").
140. Robert F. Utter, a Washington Supreme Court justice, underscored how the polit-
ical forces affecting state courts make judges
aware of the need to be sensitive to public concerns and to carefully explain why
value choices that must be made in decisions are chosen. State judges also fre-
quently participate in public education regarding the role of the courts in a consti-
tutional government. This is part of the ongoing education of the public for the
support that judges must give to basic concepts of personal rights contained in the
bills of rights of the federal and state constitutions.
Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19, 48 (1989).
141. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W2d 186,215 (Ky. 1989) (noting that
the only constitutional provision governing this case was the education clause of the Ken-
tucky constitution). This contrasts with the lower court's reliance on the equality guaran-
tees. See Council for Better Educ., Inc. v. Wilkinson, No. 85-CI-1759, slip. op. at 15 (Ky.
Franklin Cir. Ct. Div. I, May 31, 1988). For equality guarantees, see supra note 97.
142. Ky. CONST. § 183.
143. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214.
144. Id.
145. The court's ruling was clear and simple:
We have decided one legal issue-and one legal issue only.., that the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth has failed to establish an efficient system of com-
mon schools throughout the Commonwealth. Lest there be any doubt, the result
of our decision is that Kentucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitu-
tional. There is no allegation that only part of the common school system is invalid,
and we find no such circumstance. This decision applies to the entire sweep of the
system-all its parts and parcels. This decision applies to the statutes creating, im-
plementing and financing the system and to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto.
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to public education and to change its previously entrenched educational
system.147 The executive and legislature seized that opportunity, bringing
in renowned consultants and taking reams of testimony before enacting a
plan providing for a quality education for all.14
FIGURE 1: THE PoLICY WINDow CREATED BY ROSE
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While the court did not pinpoint a specific policy, it outlined a vision
of an educational system consistent wvith the state's constitutional commit-
ment to education.' The court structured the reform process through
substantive requirements derived from the constitutional mandate,150 and
Id. at 215.
146. KiNGDON, supra note 3, at 174-76. Kingdon explains this concept as follows:
[P]olicy windows, the opportunities for action on given initiatives, present themi-
selves and stay open for only short periods. If the participants cannot or do not
take advantage of these opportunities, they must bide their time until the next
opportunity comes along.
Id. at 174.
147. The court opened this policy window self-consciously, explaining that "[wile view
this decision as an opportunity for the General Assembly to launch the Commonwealth into
a new era of educational opportunity which will ensure a strong economic, cultural and
political future." Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216. Justice Gant's concurrence underscored this
view:
This decision has provided the Executive and Legislative branches of our govern-
ment with a rare opportunity to start with a clean slate; to utilize the expertise of
its members and others (both inside and outside the state) to study other jurisdic-
tions which have faced a similar problem and successfully solved it; and to stamp a
distinguished impression upon the pages of the history of this Commonwealth.
Id. at 217 (Gant, J., concurring). Unlike the New Jersey court, the Kentucky court broadly
outlined the need for quality-based reforms and underscored their importance to the state,
rather than demanding changes in distributional equity. Mi at 211-13.
148. Michael Jennings, COUFIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 12, 1990, at 1A.
149. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212413 (summarizing the essential and minimal characteristics
of an "efficent" system of common schools).
150. Id.
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declared the state responsible for direct supervision of the system.351 Fur-
thermore, it called on the legislature to provide additional overall funding
to education 152 and warned that the state could not shift the constitutional
obligation to provide adequate educational opportunities to local govern-
ments.153 These requirements forced the governor and the legislature to
work within the shaded area of Figure 1, an area representing a level of
overall quality which inherently necessitates a certain level of distributional
equity.' 54 Framed in this manner, the reforms cohered with the public's
concern for educational quality and simultaneously provided political pro-
tection for taxes to support greater distributional equity.155 By declaring
the entire educational system to be unconstitutional, the court also strongly
underscored that the state must comprehensively confront its educational
problems; that is, if some students are not receiving an adequate education,
the entire system is unconstitutional. 56
The program devised by the Kentucky legislature allows teachers,
principals, and parents to team up at each school to make most instruc-
tional and school-management decisions.15  It also provides them with ad-
ditional resources and incentives to invest in education. 58 The Kentucky
151. Id. at 211.
152. Id at 197.
153. Id. at 211.
154. Id. at 211-12.
155. See Constitutional Intent, supra note 88, at 160 (noting the moral authority of the
court's ruling which connected and mobilized the entire public based on its appeal to their
constitutional commitment to education); see also Adams, supra note 100, at 324-25. Ad-
ams aptly characterized the Kentucky experience: "In short, the Kentucky Supreme Court
presented the commonwealth with an unprecedented opportunity: to reconstitute the
state's elementary and secondary school system so as to provide equitable and adequate
educational opportunities to all Kentucky school children." Id.
156. By broadening the educational issue "beyond the plea of the plaintiffs [and their
focus on equity]" in declaring the whole school system inadequate, the Kentucky Supreme
Court forced the legislature to devise a comprehensive reform program addressing more
than the questions of educational equity sparked by education financing litigation in the
other states, such as New Jersey. See Michael Jennings, Reform Plan Seen as National
Modeh Gets Wide Support, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), May 6, 1990, at IA.
157. The investment into and innovation in education over the past three years have
been remarkable. See, e.g., Mary Jordan, Kentucky's Retooled Classrooms "Erase the Board
Clean," WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1993, at A3. Jordan described the improved conditions:
Boys lug dolls and diapers for two weeks straight as part of an introductory course
in parenting. Saturday classes and tougher tests emphasize the value of learning.
Desks come with laptop computers, which students will soon be able to check out
like library books. And the school recently installed computer-ready telephone
hookups in every classroom, joining other schools implementing reforms man-
dated throughout Kentucky three years ago in the nation's most technologically
advanced public school system....
The new way includes untimed class periods; less-structured subjects so, for in-
stance, English and math lessons can be combined; community service in nursing
homes and elsewhere; parenting lessons; and new family resource centers inside to
deal with everything from divorce depression to joblessness.
Id.
158. Id.
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Education Reform Act of 1990 (KERA), 5 9 which addresses financing,
governance, and curricular concerns, 160 is remarkable both for its compre-
hensive solution to the problems in the state's educational system161 and
for its effort to measure educational success by progress in learning, rather
than compliance with regulations. 161 If individual schools do not improve
to the level required by the state, 63 the state can impose sanctions against
them."6 The sanctions include sending outside managers to intervene, fir-
ing the school's administrative and teaching staff, allowing parents to re-
move their children, and even closing the school1 6s This school reform
package also included $2.5 billion in additional education funds drawn
from increases in the sales tax and personal and corporate income taxes. e6
At a symposium at Harvard Law School, former Kentucky governor
and lawyer for the Rose plaintiffs, Bert T. Combs, and state Senator
Michael R. Moloney termed the combination of Kentucky's grassroots sup-
port for education reform and the far-reaching judicial decision that precip-
itated the 1990 General Assembly's action "a near miracle."1 67 In Combs'
words:
159. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476 (Baldwin) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin 1990)).
160. For a fuller description of this program, see Adams, supra note 100, at 328-36.
161. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476. Commentators have praised this aspect of
Kentucky's reforms. See, e.g., Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in
Texas, New Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 401,417-21 (1991). Benson noted:
The Kentucky case represents the most comprehensive attack yet on the constitu-
tionality of a state educational system. Instead of focusing on financial issues, as
do the first generation of cases and the recent Texas litigation, in Kentucky finan-
cial questions play only a subsidiary role in the reform of public education. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky did require the Kentucky General Assembly to
change school financing, but these required changes were simply a means to reach
a far broader set of goals.
Id. at 417.
162. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476, §§ 3,4,5, 11. Former Assistant U.S. Secretary
of Education Chester Fimn, now a Vanderbilt University professor and head of the Washing-
ton-based Education Excellence Network, praised the Kentucky reform package for em-
bracing "all the right ideas," including the notion that "you should organize and regulate
your education through the results" it achieves. Jennings, supra note 156, at Al.
163. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476, § 11. Compliance with state requirements will
be determined by a series of tests geared to measure schools against their own potential.
The overall test scores for a school will take into account each school's attendance record,
dropout rate, and the percentage of students held back in a grade. These results %All then be
publicly released so that taxpayers can learn whether their money is being spent in ways that
benefit students. Editorial, KERA: Making A Difference, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Aug. 8, 1993, at 2D.
164. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476, § 5(6); William Celils 3d, Local Running of
Kentucky Schools Leads to Rewards, and Some Stress, N.Y. TirEs, July 3, 1991, at A17.
165. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476, § 5(6); Unaccountable, Ineducable, Unmanage-
able, Unreformable, ECONOMIs-r, Mar. 16, 1991, at 19.
166. 1990 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 476, §§ 105-12(a), 284(7), 124(4); Jennings, supra
note 148, at 1A.
167. Carolyn Gatz, School-Reform Law Hailed at Harvard, CouruRR-JouRNAL (Louis-
ville, Ky.), Feb. 10, 1991, at B1.
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The great difference in Kentucky is that the legislature, rather
than paying lip service to the court and dragging its feet as has
happened in other states, faced up to its constitutional responsi-
bilities.... It grabbed the ball and ran with it.... Kentucky has
now, by reason of this [court] decision, decided to become edu-
cated and embarked on a crusade.... We're determined in Ken-
tucky to make this school reform fly.' 68
The public and political support for the court's decision and the lack of
significant protest to the tax increases may be rooted in the public's strong
commitment to education. 169 Taxpayers supported the decision to increase
funding for the public school system by $2.5 billion, 7 ° presumably to en-
sure better schools for their children and better qualified citizens for their
workforces.
The public's support for higher quality schools and the program's com-
mitment to accountability were critical to the program's success in improv-
ing both the quality and distributional equity of Kentucky's school system.
The Kentucky school reform law has considerably narrowed the gap be-
tween the best funded and worst funded school districts.17' Unlike New
Jersey's remedial scheme, which alienated wealthier districts by capping
the amount that they could spend, Kentucky's program implemented a
fund-matching formula, which matches all districts' increases in education
spending, but reimburses poorer districts at a higher rate.172 While this
financing scheme, motivated by both equity and quality concerns, has been
168. Id. at B1, B4.
169. Thirty-eight percent of the public cited education as the state's number one prob-
lem after the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Rose. This was twice the percentage of
those who cited jobs and economic development as the state's greatest problem. Dick
Kaukas, Bluegrass State Polk Education Outranks Jobs as State's Main Problem, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 2, 1990, at B1.
170. Rorie Sherman, Tackling Education Financing: Lawmakers and Courts Battle
Over Disparities Among School Districts, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1991, at 23.
171. Michael Jennings, Inequity In School Funding Is Fading, Official Tells Panel, Cou.
RIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 14, 1990, at lB. Ron Moubray, head of the Kentucky
Department of Education's office of school administration and finance, reported:
Last year [1990], only 21 school districts had funding of more than $3,000 per child;
this year, 173 of the state's 176 school districts are above that figure. The funding
gap between Fort Thomas, a relatively wealthy school district in Campbell County,
and Floyd County, a relatively poor district, has narrowed from $912 per child last
year to only $178 per child this year.
Id.
172. Id. For example, this formula might offer two dollars in state funds for every
dollar increase in education spending by a poorer district, but only one dollar in state funds
for a dollar increase by a richer district. Hence, Ron Moubray, head of the Kentucky De-
partment of Education's office of school administration and finance, commented: "I believe
equity has arrived through this formula... [I have] difficulty finding anything substantially
wrong [with it]". Id.
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successful in Kentucky,1" it might not be as successful in closing the gap in
states such as New Jersey, in which greater disparities between school dis-
tricts are evident. 74 However, even from the standpoint of pure equity
concerns, even a less successful scheme clearly is preferable to the gridlock
which existed in New Jersey.
B. The Case of New Jersey: Frustration of Equity-Centered Reform
In New Jersey, the interaction of several factors175 influenced the judi-
ciary's crafting of a narrow distributional remedy in Abbott I. 176 First, the
legislature was heavily Democratic, and the Democratic governor was al-
ready crafting an educational program with significant redistributive ele-
ments 77 Therefore, the court probably did not foresee the long-term
public resistance that would emerge from its remedial decision. Second,
the state judiciary enjoyed a reputation as an activist court.17s Third, the
state's highest court had earlier declared the state's financing scheme un-
constitutional, thereby setting a precedent for the court's involvement in
the issue.179 Finally, New Jersey Supreme Court justices do not face reelec-
tion and therefore need not defend their decisions before the full electo-
rate.'8 0 Comforted by the governor's support and by their partial
insulation from political pressures, the justices faced few institutional in-
centives to present a politically palatable decision.
173. Early studies have assessed KERA's results favorably. See, e.g., Stephen J. Goetz
& David L. Debertin, Rural Areas and Education Reform in Kentucky: An Early Assess-
ment of Revenue Equalization, 18 J. EDUC. FiN. 163, 172 (1992) ("To the extent that the
KERA intended to increase the per-pupil availability of funds in poorer, and often rural,
school districts it has thus been successful").
174. Kern Alexander, former president of Western Kentucky University and an expert
on school finance who participated in early stages of the Kentucky case, noted that Ken-
tucky is relatively unique in its ability to raise its poorer districts to the level of their more
advantaged neighbors without forcing any school district to give up large resources to ex-
pand poorer districts' resources. In other states, with greater disparities, Alexander noted
that "leveling up" is not likely. Gatz, supra note 167, at B4. See also infra part IILC.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
176. Abbott v. Burke I, 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990).
177. Jerry Gray, Judge Says Trenton Spending Fails Mandate to Aid Schools, N.Y.
TMi.s, Sept. 1, 1993, at Al, B5 ("Anticipating the court's ruling, Mr. Florio had already
begun pushing his own school spending plan, the Quality Education Act, through the Legis-
lature, which was then controlled by Democrats.").
178. See Tarr, supra note 63, at 855 (citing the state supreme court's elaboration of
criteria for legitimately diverging from U.S. Supreme Court decisions as evidence of its rep-
utation for activism); cf. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 731 (1975) (holding that the New Jersey constitution provides a right against exclusion-
ary zoning), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
179. See Robinson v. Cahill I, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (NJ. 1973) (rejecting plaintiff's equal
protection claim but finding that the financing system violates provisions in the state consti-
tution which impose a duty on the state to provide equal educational opportunity), cert.
denied sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
180. Members do not face reelection, but are subject to reappointment by the governor
and reconfirmation by the senate at the end of every seven year term. See NJ. CONsT. art.
VI, § 6, para. 1; see also CouNcrL OF STATE GOVERMIMErrs, supra note 137, at 191.
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Because the court's battle with the legislature over the Robinson case
fourteen years earlier had failed to effect any enduring change in educa-
tional equity,181 Abbott II forced the court to reconsider the constitutional
mandate of a "thorough and efficient education.""l  The court again fo-
cused on distributional equity issues, mandating that the legislature provide
additional funding to twenty-eight of the poorer inner-city districts.
18 3
Governor Florio's plan, the Quality Education Act (QEA),18 went even
further. It targeted aid to an additional two school districts and capped the
spending of wealthier districts in order to realize greater distributional eq-
uity.' 85 The legislature passed Florio's plan with little public deliberation
or discussion.'
8 6
Figure 2, below, represents the shifts in educational policy-points P,
P1, P2, etc.-relative to distributional equity concerns (the X-axis) and
quality concerns (the Y-axis). Since the debate focused exclusively on is-
sues of distributional equity, the positions of the institutional actors are
represented as values along the X-axis. For example, the judiciary (J)
called for a level of distributional equity greater than that of value P. Simi-
larly, the governor (G) and the legislature (L) supported a plan that redis-
tributed educational funding even more than what was called for by the
court. The point P represents state policy in the late 1980s, while the shift
to P1 reflects the impact of the judiciary's Abbott II decision and P2 repre-
sents state policy following passage of the QEA.
181. See LEHNE, supra note 31, at 200.
182. Abbott v. Burke II, 575 A.2d 359, 384 (NJ. 1990).
183. Id. at 408.
184. Quality Education Act of 1990, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7D-1 to 18A:7D-37 (West
Supp. 1994). The name of the statute reveals that the drafters may have viewed their nar-
rowly focused program (addressing only equity-based concerns) as motivated by a desire to
extend the quality wealthier school districts already enjoyed to poorer districts. However,
the Act failed to deal with school governance, curriculum, and financial issues. This Article
focuses on the politics of implementation of the court-ordered remedies; it does not discuss
the mechanics of the QEA. For a detailed overview of the Act, see Margaret E. Goertz,
School Finance Reform in New Jersey: The Saga Continues, 18 J. EDuc. FIN. 346, 350-54
(1993).
185. Quality Education Act of 1990, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7D-1, 18A:7D-28 (West
Supp. 1994); see also Gray, supra note 177, at Al. Gray reported:
[Florio] signed the controversial legislation on July 3, 1990, barely a month after
the court decision. The QEA, as the spending plan is commonly known, went well
beyond the court mandate. It increased the special needs districts to 30 from the
28 identified by the court, and it allocated $1.1 billion over five years.
Id.
186. Stephen Barr, Florio's Response to Tax Critics Is Questioned, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5,
1990, § 12 (New Jersey Weekly) at 1, 6.
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Both during and after the debate, the QEA's proponents-the Abbott
11 plaintiffs, the governor, and members of the legislature-failed to
explain its reforms or to build any significant grassroots support for
them.'87 The reforms, particularly a record tax increase to support redis-
tributive transfers, alienated both middle class taxpayers and residents of
wealthier school districts.18 A voter backlash almost gave Christine Todd
Whitman, a virtually unknown candidate in the 1990 U.S. Senate race who
capitalized on the public anger over the tax increases, a victory over Bill
Bradley, the popular Democratic incumbent.189
187. Id. at 1. Richard W. Roper, director of the New Jersey Affairs program at the
Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton University,
commented-
I do not understand why Florio has decided to let the dust settle before putting
forward an aggressive attempt to shape public perception. Rather than mount an
orchestrated campaign to educate the public, Mr. Florio has responded that there
will not be acceptance of increases in sales and income taxes and changes in the
state's school financing formula until people begin to get the promised long-term
benefit of property tax relief next year.
Id.
188. Gray, supra note 177, at B5 ("To raise the money and to close a large budget gap,
Mr. Florio pushed through a record $2.8 billion tax bill; it sent his popularity plummeting.");
see also Neal R. Pierce, Lessons from a Political Pariah, NAT'L JOURNAL, Mar. 16, 1991, at
659. Pierce commented on how support for Florio's program
boomeranged so viciously that Florio, 14 months into his term, is now left with 18-
20 per cent approval ratings, among the lowest in the history of polling. His name
is close to a curse word on the lips of thousands of New Jerseyans. Florio's poli-
cies generated such fury that "Hands Across New Jersey," a kind of blue-collar
middle-class "rm-mad-and-rm-not-going-to-take-it-anymore" coalition, sprang
into being. It wants to undo Florio's tax hikes, reverse his subsidies to the inner
cities and rout his legislative allies this fall.
Id.
189. Peter Kerr, Senate Race: Bradley, Heavily Favored, Narrowly Defeats Whitman,
N.Y. TndMs, Nov. 7, 1990, at B10.
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In response, Governor Florio and the legislature agreed to "pay back"
two-thirds of the increased tax revenues in the form of property tax re-
lief.190 After the elections, both the governor and the legislature retreated
from their original positions (represented below as a shift to G1 and L1).
Since members of the legislature distanced themselves from distributional
equity concerns more than the governor did, they forged a compromise
position with the amended QEA (P3).
FIGURE 3: TiH COMPROMISE IN RESPONSE TO
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The compromise position (P3) did not satisfy the more conservative
state senate, which favored a less redistributive policy (such as that repre-
sented by L1). However, the senate lacked the votes to override the gover-
nor's veto of any legislative attack on the new status quo created by the
initial court decision (P1) and the Quality Education Act (P2). The senate
did request-unsuccessfully-that it be allowed to intervene in the case to
express its distinct views on the issue.191
Voter anger continued through the 1991 mid-term legislative elections,
and Democratic legislators lost in overwhelming numbers. However, the
190. Iver Peterson, Statewide School Tax Is Proposed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993, at B6.
191. Kathleen Bird, Senate Seeks To Enter Latest Round in Abbott, N.J. L.J., July 18,
1991, at 3. Bird noted that
if the justices grant the Senate's request to intervene, legislators would be able to
present their own evidence and witnesses and conduct cross-examination if, at
some point down the road, lower court hearings are held on the issue. It would
also give the Senate standing in the future to appeal an adverse ruling, even if the
attorney general, on behalf of the state, decides not to do so. And it would give
[State Senate President John] Lynch another platform from which to express his
views. "Furthermore," says Lynch, "it is possible that the Legislative and Execu-
tive branches may have different views as to how to meet this mandate.... [T]he
process of developing a new statewide education plan is dynamic and on-going,
and each coordinate branch of State government should be represented before the
Court to present its positions.
Id. The request was denied, although Lynch was allowed to file an amicus curiae brief.
Kathleen Bird, Victory for 2 Sides?, NJ. LJ., July 25, 1991, at 8.
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new Republican majority favored a much less redistributive policy (1-2 ),
and Florio agreed to a further compromise (represented by P4 in Figure 4)
to avert a showdown during the 1993 gubernatorial elections. The one-year
plan, the Public School Reform Act of 1992,192 sought to provide a bridge
between the amended QEA (P3) and some future plan to be developed by
an educational task force.193 In addition to its additional tax relief, the
compromise plan raised the spending cap imposed on wealthier districts,
thus increasing the funding disparity between poorer and richer districts.
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The Republican majorities in the legislature still preferred an even less
redistributive policy than the 1992 compromise (P4),194 but realized that
such legislation faced the threat of a gubernatorial veto and of a new court
decision in the continuing litigation. In July of 1992, the Republican Senate
considered eliminating the education clause through a constitutional
amendment to dismantle the QEA and to end the judiciary's influence over
education policy.195 To many critics, the effort to amend the constitutional
guarantee of a "thorough and efficient" education seemed like an attack on
the public's commitment to education.396 Under pressure from religious,
192. NJ. REv. STAT. § 66 (1992).
193. Jerry Gray, Florio Agrees to Revisions in School Act, N.Y. Tilhs, Dec. 14,1992, at
B1. A senior Florio administration official noted. "On one side we have a group that says
the state is not moving fast enough on this matter and on the other side you have a Republi-
can legislature saying the state is moving too fast. ... Then you have a court decision
looming over you. It's sheer chaos and the Governor is caught in the middle of it." Id.
194. Wayne King, Trenton G.O.P. Shifting SchoolAid to Suburbs, N.Y. TiM.ts, Aug. 30,
1992, at 40.
195. Jerry Gray, G.O.P. Is Told Not to Alter Constitution, N.Y. Tims, July 14, 1992, at
B6.
196. Jerry Gray, Pace Resumed by Legislators After a Break, N.Y. Tim~s, July 21, 1992,
at B5.
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civil rights, and civil liberties organizations, the Republicans withdrew the
proposal' 97 and limited their work to revising the education act itself.198
The Abbott I plaintiffs, however, found the 1992 compromise inade-
quate and filed Abbott 11X. In the trial court, Superior Court Judge Paul G.
Levy mandated that the state devote an additional $450 million to the
poorer districts whose state aid had been cut by the amended QEA (J in
Figure 5).199 This remedy, requiring an exact dollar amount,200 was unprec-
edented in school finance litigation. 20 After the court specified this rem-
edy, Governor Florio requested that the legislature provide an additional
$300 million for the poorer urban school districts (illustrated as G2).
However, the legislature refused to provide this additional funding and in-
stead used these funds for statewide property tax relief.20 3 The new polit-
ical equilibrium which produced the 1992 compromise (P4)-anchored by
the Republican legislature's opposition to redistributive policies-pre-
vented either the lower court's decision (J1) or Florio's compromise propo-
sal (G2) from being implemented.
FIGURE 5: FLORIO'S FINAL EFFORT
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The election of Christine Todd Whitman as governor in 1993 made any
court-ordered remedy even more likely to encounter resistance. While
197. Id.
198. King, supra note 194, at 40.
199. Abbott v. Burke HI, No. 91-C-00150, 1993 WL 379818 at *10 (N.J. Super, Aug. 31,
1993); see also Peterson, supra note 190, at B6.
200. Abbott v. Burke III, No. 91-C-00150, 1993 WL 379818 at *10 (N.J. Super, Aug. 31,
1993).
201. The New Jersey court became the first state court ever to specify in precise dollar
terms the educational funding deficiency that created the unconstitutional state of affairs.
See All Things Considered: New Jersey School Funding Reform Ruled Unconstitutional (Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 7, 1993) available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
202. Iver Peterson, As Whitman Nears Inauguration, Deficit Complicates Tax-Cut Vow,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1994, at B1.
203. Id.
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Florio had been committed to implementing a redistributive school financ-
ing program, Whitman criticized Florio's actions and committed herself to
cutting state taxes.204 The court might have had an ally in the commission
appointed pursuant to the 1992 compromise plan 05 but political forces
militated against the type of equity-based school financing and educational
reform outlined in Abbott II and pursued by Governor Florio. Neverthe-
less, Governor Whitman did not abandon the constitutional obligation to
provide a "thorough and efficient" education; she appointed her own com-
mission to outline a constitutionally acceptable solution?25 Rather than
focusing on distributional equity, the Whitman commission's plan sets a
level of educational adequacy and provides a mechanism which will "level
up" the poorer school districts through increased state aid.30
7
The strength of the political forces, which fought increased distribu-
tional equity and limited the court's ability to spur such reforms, is not
surprising from the standpoint of positive political theory. Positive political
theory explains that it is difficult to build a coalition for explicitly redistrib-
utive policies at the state level, because states that engage in such policies
risk losing wealthier residents to other states.3m Wealthier residents may
choose between exiting the community or exercising their voice within the
community through involvement in local politics.m9 Exit might appear an
especiallly attractive option in a state like New Jersey, where residents
might feel more connected to a greater metropolitan area (i.e., New York
or Philadelphia) or to a region (i.e., the Northeast) than to the state itself.
Moreover, wealthier residents who choose not to move will be able to exert
a disproportionate amount of influence through the political process310
The New Jersey court, influenced by the federal judiciary's experience
with school desegregation and its own failure to spark meaningful reform
through its previous education financing decisions, may have deliberately
204. Peterson, supra note 190, at B6.
205. Id.
206. See Iver Peterson, Trenton Panel Offers Plan on School Aid, N.Y. Tmiss, Apr. 8,
1994, at B1.
207. Id. at B5.
208. See, e.g., PETE~soN, supra note 86, at 66-92; see also Vicki L Been, "Exit" as a
Constraint on Land Use Extractions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 COLuM. L. REv. 473, 514-28 (1991) (describing the literature and the findings that resi-
dents tend to "vote with their feet"). While both Peterson and Been discuss the propensity
of residents at the local level to move based on higher tax rates and fiscal policies, their
insights apply with nearly equal force to the propensity to move from one state to another.
209. ALBERT 0. H IRSCHMiAN, ExIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). Hence, it is important to note that the
strength of a resident's state or local civic identity will encourage a resident to exercise her
voice through political participation rather than "voting with her feet" and leaving the state.
210. See e.g., FRANCis F. PivEN & RICHARD A. CLOWVARD, WHY Ahm.RCANs DoN'T
VoT 4 (1988) (concluding that the "American electorate overrepresents those who have
more, and underrepresents those who have less"); PETERSON, supra note 86, at 90 ("In local
government, which has a smaller constituency, it is easier for dominant economic [i.e.,
wealthier] interests to control policy to the exclusion of weaker, less organized interests").
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adopted a strategy that focused on distributional equity rather than overall
quality. When even this distributional strategy failed in Abbott 11,211 the
New Jersey Supreme Court changed course. Rather than affirm the lower
court's redistributive remedy, in Abbott III the court opted for a more
open-ended remedy, giving the legislature three years to achieve "substan-
tial equivalence" of parity.212 The court did not specifically order the court
to achieve parity by that time, but indicated that it would intervene if the
legislature failed to improve the situation. 1 3 The court's action (repre-
sented by J2 in Figure 6) effectively forced policy to move toward greater
distributional equity (P5).
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In Abbott III, the court was self-consciously aware of the political
ramifications of its actions and of the need to build a social consensus for
reform. 14 The need for such a consensus underlies the court's more mod-
erate stance, its appeal to a collective identity,15 its focus on the state's
social responsibility, 16 and its emphasis on oversight and efficiency.
217
These ingredients were missing from the court's initial approach; the reac-
tions to the court's decision in Abbott II suggest a better chance of lasting
success. For example, Assembly Speaker Chuck Haytaian praised the deci-
sion by explaining: "I believe in parity and we will achieve it.... But we
will do it by building up needy districts, not by tearing down good ones."
218
211. See Abbott v. Burke III, 643 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 1994) (noting the failure of the
QEA to solve the problem, although it purported to respond to the mandate in Abbott I).
212. See Mondics, supra note 131, at B1.
213. IL
214. See Abbott v. Burke III, 643 A.2d 575, 580-81 (N.J. 1994).
215. ld. at 581.
216. Id. at 580.
217. Id. at 579.
218. Joseph F. Sullivan, Top Jersey Court Orders New Plan for School Funds: To Aid
Poor Areas: 3 Years to Reach Parity in Money for Needy and Rich Districts, N.Y. TIMEs, July
13, 1994, at Al, B6.
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III
LESSONS FROM THE COMPARISON OF KENTUCKY AND NEW
JERSEY
A. The Judiciary: Institutional Actor and Constitutional Interpreter
Consideration of both the constitutional underpinnings and the polit-
ical dynamics of implementing education reform remedies suggests that
state courts adjudicating education reform cases should focus on overall
quality, viewing distributional equity as a secondary concern. In essence,
the courts play at a great disadvantage in the single, horizontal-axis equity
"game." While some commentators blame state courts for their inability to
ensure equity (their failure to win in this game),21 9 one cannot ignore the
political forces that militate against their success?20 However, a focus on a
second (vertical) axis, representing quality, alters the nature of the game
and redefines the political environment. A court can spark new considera-
tion of education reform by correctly framing the constitutional commit-
ment to a quality education for all and outlining the other branches'
responsibility to implement this commitment. Moreover, the courts can
open a "policy window" by creating a sense of urgency and by offering the
legislative and executive branches political protection for actions such as
comprehensive reform and tax increases.
The Kentucky Supreme Court successfully provided each of these ele-
ments. First, the court framed the issue as one of overall quality, sparking a
deliberative and innovative process of education reform that involved both
the public and political branches of government?2 1 Second, the court gave
the legislature a clear one-year deadline, creating a sense of urgency and
opening a policy window for comprehensive legislative action on an issue
of public interest z 2 Indeed, some legislators even speculated that a legis-
lative response would not have been possible if the court had merely ruled
that the school finance system, considered alone, was unconstitutional.m3
Finally, the court's action offered political protection, legitimacy, and sup-
port for the legislature's action.2 4 From its approach, it was evident that
219. See Note, supra note 5, at 1092.
220. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
221. When this Article discusses the role of litigation, it also means to include the effect
of the parties' litigation and grassroots strategy on the success of implementing a remedy.
222. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989). Jack D.
Rose, the county superintendent (and named plaintiff in the case), explained that as a result
of the decision, "[b]asically we were able to erase the board clean and do away with every-
thing as it was. It's probably the cleanest sweep [the country] has had in education." Jor-
dan, supra note 157, at A3.
223. Alexander, supra note 107, at 363 (citing address by Senator Michael Moloney,
Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Kentucky Senate).
224. Id. at 343.
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Kentucky had learned from the failures of other states that focused exclu-
sively on equity and excluded the public and the legislature from the pro-
cess of interpreting and implementing the constitutional mandate. Because
of its attention to these lessons, "the Kentucky high court has gone the
furthest in finance-inspired education reform and has met with the least
resistance. '
' 21 5
The New Jersey court met none of these elements. Instead, the court
and governor framed the issue around raising taxes to support poor inner
cities, while failing to establish oversight mechanisms to ensure improve-
ments in quality. The court's decision, combined with Governor Florio's
haste to enact a plan, undercut any possibility for the legislature meaning-
fully to consider and for the public to learn about the urgency of the issue.
Finally, since the Florio plan went further than the court's remedy, the con-
stitutionally based decision did not offer effective political protection for
the QEA.21 6 That is not to say that the constitutional nature of the deci-
sion did not support the governor's action at all. In fact, the senate decided
not to seek a constitutional amendment because it was aware of the pub-
lic's widespread commitment to overall educational quality.22 7 However,
the court's equity-based interpretation of the constitution's education
clause did not connect with the public's deep concerns for educational
quality, and Governor Florio failed to persuade the public that his agenda
was focused on quality or was based on the court's decision. Florio's haste
to act without ensuring improvements in quality, and his failure to educate
the public about the need for reform, led voters to complain that education
did not benefit from the extra resources.2 This result is not surprising; the
Florio administration itself conceded that it had failed to define how the
equalized funding would make a difference and had failed to implement a
program to evaluate and explain the changes.229
225. Sherman, supra note 170, at 23.
226. Reflecting upon this action after the court ordered an additional $500 million for
education to these districts, Christine Todd Whitman said the ruling reflected another failed
Florio program:
Had the Governor in 1990 waited for the Supreme Court opinion rather than rush
headlong into a $2.8 billion tax increase, we might not be involved in the court
action today. Obviously, we will await any further judicial action on this issue, but
it is inescapable that the actions of the Florio administration did nothing to solve
the problem; rather, it made the problem worse.
Gray, supra note 177, at Al.
227. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
228. Priscilla Van Tassel, As Schools Open, Many Ask if the State Knows How to Add,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1993, at B1.
229. Dr. Mary Lee Fitzgerald, New Jersey's Commissioner of Education, admitted that
until the fall of 1993, the Florio administration failed to define what would be accomplished,
neglected to set up a system to measure these accomplishments, and did not adequately
explain these programs to the public. Id.
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B. Constitutional Theory, Litigation Strategy, and the Political Process
A constitutional theory and positive political theory analysis of the liti-
gation in Kentucky and New Jersey offers lessons not only to the judiciary,
but also to those litigating education reform cases. As we might expect, the
different litigation strategies employed in the Kentucky and New Jersey
cases foreshadowed the different approaches to constitutional interpreta-
tion and the political games which unfolded in each state. The Kentucky
education reform effort was led by Bert T. Combs, a former governor who
had championed education and understood the connections between con-
stitutional litigation and the dynamics of the political process.230 Combs
sought to build middle-class support for the movement, educate the public
on the need for reform, build public confidence in the reforms, work with
the legislature, and ensure that wealthier school districts were not alienated
by the reforms3P' Hence, shortly after the court's decision, Combs under-
scored that due to the plaintiff's litigation strategy, the ruling would not
hurt wealthier school districts:
The plaintiffs in this case said in their complaint, and we have said
in every motion, every pleading and every argument[,] that we do
not want-and will not tolerate-taking money from one school
district and giving it to another...
As a citizen of this state and one who knows something about
this situation and will have some influence on it, that will not hap-
pen.... These plaintiffs don't want it, and they will have some
control over it3P
2
Not only was Combs careful not to alienate wealthier districts, but his cam-
paign for reform of the education system often centered on appeals to a
collective identity. Hence, he observed and appealed to the "feeling
among the people... that the time had come when they had to do some-
thing about their school system or... we would always remain a mediocre
state.'- 3 Governor Wallace Wilkinson's statement upon signing the new
education reform law reflected the success of Combs' strategy of appealing
to civic pride: "On this day, more than any other, I am proud to be a Ken-
tuckian."2-31 Recognizing Combs' effective combination of litigation and
political strategy, Harvard law professor Christopher Edley noted that
230. Bob Johnson, Combs Touched State Profoundly, CoUFR-JouNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Dec. 5, 1991 at 1A, 12A (obituary describing the career of the former governor).
231. These efforts are outlined in Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain Pool:
The Role of Litigation, Law and Lawyers in Kentucky Educational Reform, 17 3. EDUC. FiN.
83 (1991). For example, citizens' groups allied with the litigation organized hundreds of
town meetings to promote education reform before the case was decided by the Kentucky
Supreme Court. See id. at 111.
232. Tom Loftus, Combs Says Ruling Won't Spell Trouble for Wealthier Schools, Cou-
RmR-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 12, 1989, at lB.
233. Sherman, supra note 170, at 231 (quoting Bert Combs) (emphasis added).
234. Jennings, supra note 148.
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"[o]ne striking thing about the Kentucky case is that we have a marriage of
politics and lawyering that demonstrates the enormous capacity to make
progress on serious social problems. ' 35
Unlike Governor Combs, the New Jersey plaintiffs did not seek to
build a broad-based coalition. The New Jersey plaintiffs did not ask for
broad, statewide reform, nor did they appeal to a collective identity or the
constitutional commitment to an overall quality education. Instead,
Marilyn Morheuser, the lawyer for the Education Law Center who brought
the New Jersey lawsuit, argued that "this Court cannot stand by while an-
other generation of children in poor urban districts, their hopes raised by
inspiring and lofty constitutional pronouncements, sees these hopes dashed
on the political rocks below. '2 36 The plaintiffs saw the judiciary as an ally
of "poor urban districts" against a hostile political process. In essence, this
view draws upon "the myth of rights," which endows courts with the power
simply to prescribe a right that will then be realized, regardless of whether
it draws upon public support.2 37 Such an approach, based upon a narrow
conception of democracy, ignores the role of the political process in imple-
menting reform; it contributed, in fact, to the failure of reform in New
Jersey.238
C. Considering the Constraints: Could New Jersey Have Followed the
Path Not Taken?
The central argument of this Article is that New Jersey's Supreme
Court, education reform lawyers, and political actors failed properly to
conceptualize the constitutional remedy necessary to reform its educational
system. This Article suggests that New Jersey's failure to interpret and
frame the constitutional mandate of its education clause properly resulted
in a proposed remedy doomed to political failure. However, it is also possi-
ble that, given the constraints facing the New Jersey Supreme Court, it
could not have successfully implemented a Kentucky strategy.
From the outset of each state's education reform litigation, the educa-
tional systems in the two states were very different. The Kentucky Court
acted in light of an obvious need for meaningful education reform. 39
Under many standards of educational quality, from expenditure per pupil
to American College Test (ACT) scores to pupil-teacher ratios, Kentucky
235. Gatz, supra note 167, at B4.
236. Kathleen Bird, Abbott Revisited: It's Deja Vu All Over Again; A New Round in 20
Years of Litigation Over School Financing Begins, N.J. L.J., June 20, 1991, at 4 (emphasis
added).
237. See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUB-
LIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
238. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECrIVES
ON PUBLIC IMER=ST LIBERALISM (1986) (arguing that such a strategy fails because it does
not address the basic structural issues, build grassroots support for the movement, or suc-
ceed in the political process through building a winning coalition).
239. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
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ranked in the lowest quartile nationwide.2 ° The state's literacy rate was
the lowest in the United States. l
In New Jersey, on the other hand, the flaws in the educational system
were neither as pervasive nor as pressing. On the whole, New Jersey de-
voted an impressive amount of resources to education, but had mixed re-
sults in terms of achievement. New Jersey spent more money per pupil
than any other state' 2 and offered higher teachers' salaries than all but
three other states2 43 In terms of achievement, New Jersey's suburban stu-
dents fared around the national average for suburban students in terms of
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores, while its urban students trailed the
national average for urban students by 66 points (out of 800) on the verbal
section and 74 points on the math section.244 The breakdown by race was
even more stark: New Jersey's black students scored over 200 points lower
on the combined verbal and math sections than their white peers ? 45 How-
ever, a partial cause of these relative disparities was that so many of its
students took the SAT-in 1994 only three states had a higher percentage
of students which took the exam. 6
In addition, Kentucky and New Jersey differed in the extent of income
disparity among communities and consequently in the disparity among
school districts. Witnesses at the Rose trial testified that the deficiencies in
Kentucky schools were not limited to the poorer districts and that almost
all schools provided inadequate educational opportunities? 47 In New
Jersey, however, some communities had excellent schools. Per pupil fund-
ing ranged from $11,000 in Bedminster, a wealthy suburb, to just over
$4,000 per pupil in Harrison, an inner-city school district2 4s This divide
between rich and poor in New Jersey would make it harder to pursue Ken-
tucky's leveling-up approach to school financing. 4 9 Since some schools are
240. Id. at 197-98.
241. Brief for Appellees at 1-2, Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989), cited in Stark, supra note 4, at 645.
242. N. R. Kleinfield, City and Suburbs Battle Over Distribution of Aid, N.Y. TMES,
Nov. 27, 1993, at A24.
243. Id.
244. Devin Leonard, SAT Verbal Scores Drop; Math Scores Rise; Disparity Between
N.J. City, Suburban Schools, BERGEN RECORD (NJ.), Aug. 25, 1994, at Al.
245. IL
246. Id.
247. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198.
248. Peterson, supra note 190 at B6.
249. See Sherman, supra note 170, at 23. That is not to say that Kentucky didn't also
confront the constraint of wealthier districts. Before the reforms enacted pursuant to the
court decision, Kentucky faced disparities in local revenue collections for education ranging
from $80 per pupil to $3,716 per pupil. Rodd Zolkos, States Fding School Funding Equity
Elusive, Crry & STATE, Apr. 12, 1993, at 1.
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already very well funded, New Jersey does not have the need nor the abil-
ity to fully equalize funding by raising the funding for both the wealthier
and the poorer schools.5 0
The distribution of socio-economic political power among school dis-
tricts may also explain the difference between the states. Due to the re-
quirements set by the New Jersey court, policymakers had to focus the
benefits of the education reform on the thirty poorest school districts, dis-
tricts which spent only 84 percent of the average spent by the 110 wealthi-
est communities."5 Most of these districts were located in the inner city,
and wealthier citizens might have resisted any redistributive effort.252
However, the New Jersey court's approach also created an arbitrary dis-
tinction between the thirtieth poorest school, which deserved more state
funding, and the thirty-first poorest school, which did not. This distinction
alienated a middle-class constituency which might have sympathized with
the need for education reform.z 3 Moreover, this focus on a narrow group
of students limited the ability of the courts and political actors to appeal to
civic pride and instigate the kind of statewide effort that was so successful
in Kentucky.
Even if the New Jersey court's remedy did not actively encourage an
appeal to civic pride, such an appeal might fall on deaf ears in New Jersey,
the "first all-suburban state," -1 yet also a state marked by great differences
among its citizens. Not only is New Jersey's population extremely diverse,
but it also lacks many of the foundations for collective identity: statewide
250. Kentucky raised taxes $800 million for its schools and gave 25 percent more state
aid to the poorer schools and 8 percent more aid to the wealthier schools. Mary Beth Lane,
Lawsuits Forcing States to Change, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), July 3, 1994, at All.
251. Mary McGrath, Wrestling Over School Financing Court and State Poised for High-
Stakes Confrontation, BERGEN RECORD (NJ.), May 1, 1994, at A31. The average for the
110 wealthier districts is $8,111 per pupil and the average for the 30 poorest districts is
$6,813 per pupil. Id.
252. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 4, at 667 ("Lack of success of prior funding equalization
programs shows the power of wealthier interests to thwart redistributive efforts.").
253. Commenting on Abbott III, Albert Burstein, who headed a Commission examin-
ing the need for education reform, explained:
Omitted from the court's opinion is any reference to that large cohort of school
districts and students who are in the so-called foundation aid districts. These are
the school districts that are not part of the 30 special needs grouping but are essen-
tially middle class areas.... It is undeniably the case that large numbers of dis-
tricts are going to be ending up as the new education underclass should the
Legislature's response be narrowly focused on 30 special needs districts. There is
little doubt that mid-level districts now struggling to maintain school systems at a
decent level will, because of less assistance from the state and inadequate local
resources to make up the difference, fall further and further behind.... The fund-
ing problem calls for a comprehensive solution. Any new law must encompass the
broader landscape of educational funding to ensure stability in the future and pro-
vide elements of certainty to local school budget personnel.
Albert Burstein, School Funding Debate, BERGEN RECORD (N.J.), July 17, 1994, at A19.
254. See Charles Strum, Beauty Beyond The Turnpike: Jokes Aside, New Jersey Tries to
Shed Inferiority Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at 26 (describing New Jersey's lack of a
single, central city and lack of densely populated cities).
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television stations (the network stations are based in either New York or
Philadelphia), collectively supported symbols such as sports teams (the two
football teams playing in New Jersey still maintain their New York identity
and appellation), and independent major cities (the biggest cities in the
state are part of the New York or Philadelphia metropolitan areas). Thus,
New Jersey supporters of education reform may have found it more diffi-
cult to connect to a civic identity and a collective constitutional ideal than
their counterparts in Kentucky.
One might argue that these differences undermine the conclusions of
this Article. However, the actual New Jersey experience demonstrates that
a pure redistributive approach was doomed to fail. If the differences be-
tween the states are such that the Kentucky court's model would also fail,
then judicially initiated reform of New Jersey's educational system is essen-
tially impossible. 55 Admittedly, these constraints make the implementa-
tion of any remedial effort more difficult, but this Article argues that the
overall quality approach is inherently truer to the constitutional mandate
and politically more effective.
The difference between the focus on overall quality and a more nar-
row focus on redistributive equity is not always obvious.2 6 In New Jersey,
255. While this Article is limited to a comparison of the Kentucky and New Jersey case
studies, a brief look at the experience in Michigan serves to indicate that reform under the
Kentucky model may not be impossible in a state with demographic characteristics such as
New Jersey. Like New Jersey, Michigan ranks in the top 10 states in terms of school spend-
ing. See Moneyline, CNN, Mar. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File, and
Michigan's wealthiest districts spend over three times as much on education as its poorer
districts. See Tyson, supra note 133, at 2.
Michigan's plan for education reform, like Kentucky's and unlike New Jersey's, deals
comprehensively with issues of school financing fairness and educational performance. See
Roger Worthington, States Make Radical Moves In School Funding, CHt. TiB., Mar. 8,
1994, at 2. In doing so, it recognized the state's constitutional commitment to provide for an
overall quality system of education.
The Michigan plan stabilized funding at the state level by trimming the percentage of
educational expenses financed by property taxes to 10 percent (through a $2 billion increase
in sales taxes) and setting a minimum expenditure on education of S4,200 per pupil (S1,000
more than currently spent by the poorest school districts). See Editorial, Fairer Schooling
for Michigan, N.Y. Tmms, Mar. 18, 1994, at A28. W. Robert Docking, superintendent of
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, explained that "I am pleased that the lowest-financed schools
will receive more assistance... that absolutely had to happen," but he underscored that it
should not happen at the expense of the affluent school systems. William Cells, 3d, Michi-
gan Votes for Revolution In Financing Its Public Schools, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 17, 1994, at Al,
A21.
As in Kentucky, the Michigan campaign for education reform succeeded in connecting
to the public's desire for education reform, garnering support from 69 percent of the electo-
rate. See David Van Biema, The Great Tax Switch, Tibm, Mar. 28, 1994, at 31.
256. The distinction is often missed by commentators who examine only the fact that
both the Kentucky and New Jersey Supreme Courts invalidated their education financing
schemes, and disregard or downplay the fact that these two courts employed very different
approaches in analyzing the constitutionality of their education systems. See, eg., Noreen
O'Grady, Comments: Toward a Thorough and Efficient Education: Resurrecting the Penn-
sylvania Education Clause, 67 T~mp. L. REv. 613, 630 n.102 (1994). Without examining the
different approaches, O'Grady reported that "[i]n New Jersey, a judicial decree declaring
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where many school districts already met a standard of quality, the desired
outcome of either approach-a focus on overall quality or redistributive
equity-is very similar. However, the important difference between the
two judicial approaches is not only the desired outcome, but the process by
which that outcome was achieved. As discussed in Part II, the process em-
ployed by Kentucky-the framing of a remedy consonant with overall
quality-has two advantages over New Jersey's initial effort to pinpoint an
exact redistributive remedy: (1) the overall quality approach requires the
legislature to address the need for a comprehensive remedy and recognizes
the legislature's and the public's role in constitutional interpretation;2 57 and
(2) the overall quality approach is inclusive in that it speaks to a right of all
citizens to a quality education.58
The more inclusive approach of overall quality relies on an appeal to
civic identity: namely, that the entire population benefits from all citizens
enjoying a quality education. Essentially, the problem with the narrower
focus on redistributive equity is that it highlights the differences among
citizens rather than focusing on their common interests. Even if the state
cannot completely equalize funding, an overall quality approach could still
address some financing issues while allowing the legislature and the public
to play their roles in constitutional interpretation. On the other hand, a
purely equity-based strategy, while initially successful, ultimately could not
succeed in the political process-as reflected in the most recent decision by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The contrast between the experiences of Kentucky and New Jersey
illustrates the importance of focusing on quality in education reform litiga-
tion. When a court connects to a deep public concern for overall educa-
tional quality, it can succeed in sparking meaningful reform, as the
the education funding formula unconstitutional did not prevent legislative stalemate....
However, in Kentucky, such a decree provided needed impetus to resolve legislative stale-
mate." Id.
257. See Alexander, supra note 107, at 343 ("[J]udicial intervention and interpretation
of state constitutional provisions is necessary to provide initiative and guidance for the legis-
lature if it is to abide by its constitutional obligations.").
258. Inclusiveness in crafting a remedy, as well as in constitutional interpretation gen-
erally, is critical to making a decision more palpable to those who otherwise might feel
alienated or excluded by the end result. See generally Eisgruber, supra note 76. Cf. Evans
v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (employing a
general right to political participation analysis, rather than a suspect class equal protection
analysis, to invalidate an amendment to the Colorado constitution precluding civil rights
protection to gay men and women). The concurrence in Evans provides an especially good
example of generalizing the constitutional remedy to address the rights of all citizens in
employing a privileges and immunities analysis to consider the constitutionality of the
amendment. Justice Scott explained that "[t]he importance of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause is that it does not require varying standards of review and that its protections are
extended to every citizen." 882 P.2d at 1356 (Scott, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Kentucky example demonstrates. Litigation strategies based on state con-
stitutions' education clauses will be fruitful if courts interpret such clauses
to embody the public's deep commitment to overall educational quality
and consider the political dynamics favoring a comprehensive, rather than
a district-by-district, remedy. 59 Courts and plaintiffs should follow Ken-
tucky's lead and realize that constitutional theory and positive political the-
ory favor education reform remedies that are based on an appeal for a
system that provides for overall educational quality.
259. Hence, one commentator has underscored how the more recent cases in Texas,
Kentucky, and Montana may illustrate the potential for a new revolution in school finance
litigation. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky and
Texas Decisions on the Future of School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDuc. 219,
250 (1990). This revolution appears to connect both to state education clauses and to an
overall concern for educational adequacy, rather than fiscal equity. See William Celis, 3d,
School Financing: Arguing Equity Is Not Enough, N.Y. Tmms, Apr. 29, 1992, at B8 (noting
that Connecticut, Louisiana, and Alabama are following Kentucky in focusing on educa-
tional adequacy). Hence, newly-appointed Judge David Tatel, a specialist in school financ-
ing, underscored that "what's been happening in the last few years is people are increasingly
focusing on adequacy. This is the cutting edge of education litigation." Id.
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